Anonymous/Unknown, Between 2020 and August 2022, Dialectical Cartographies.
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Dialectical Cartographies

Dialectical-Cartographies

ψ1: The New Paradigm

φ1: The Conceptual-Machines Of Western Academic Philosophy

Western philosophy contains many dichotomies, the dichotomy of being/non-being, accident/substance, contingency/essence. Each dichotomy is put to use in the organization of entities, such that it gives each entity a distinct, precisely determinate category. These categories tell us the exact nature of the entity to which they are applied to. This provides no ambiguity as to what any given entity is. In that way, it is possible for philosophy to provide us with precise truth about the nature of reality, for if there were ambiguity in what an entity was, due to an inability to precisely capture the nature of an entity into a strict category, then the true nature of reality becomes much harder to determine with the rigidity that the Western philosophical tradition demands. The philosophical tradition demands rigidity in its understanding of reality because if there were any flexibility enabled with what reality may or may not be, it means that the chase after the absolute truth becomes a pointless endeavor as indeterminacy would be inherently built into our discussions about reality. This high rigidity constructs a system of thought which naturally tends towards the increasing rigidification of thought, by building dogmatic lines of concepts. These dogmatic lines of concepts are developed such that, in the available field of ways we may interpret a concept such as justice, one interpretation is given precedence and domination over all the other possible interpretations of such concepts.

Determinism as the focal point of the construction of concepts leads into an absolutism, where the degree of indeterminacy and potential for multiple possible meanings to be extracted from texts is perpetually decreased. This eventually leads into the isolation and atomisation of concepts such that the concepts begin to exist within its own, increasingly independent realm of meaning, rather than being dependent on requiring the heavily indeterminate and messy world those very concepts are attempting to capture. This is because the more concepts must intermingle with the complexities of the world or personal experiences that these concepts are attempting to breakdown into exact truths, the more this opens pathways for these concepts to be newly interpreted and newly understood, injecting indeterminacy into them and the destruction of their ordinarily heavily contrasted, binary organization. In order for an increasingly independent world of meaning to be constructed to contain our increasingly rigidified concepts, it requires a web of other concepts in order to substantiate it, since no concept can perform any function or obtain any meaning without being networked to other entities to support it. Hence deterministic Western philosophy is the construction of a conceptual programming language which destroys nuance and capacity for alternative thinking, instead creating a constant recuperation into a sticky web of overcoded lines of

thought, which become increasingly hard to break out of the deeper into the web one gets in.

This sticky web of concepts, mutually establishing the other, generates a hidden form of hypertextuality for each concept contained in the Western canon, where concepts, being so overcoded, begin to direct lines of thought into specific locations almost automatically. The isolation and atomisation of concepts away from the world those concepts were originally meant to capture, such that they exist in their own realm of increasingly independent meaning, closing all thought off from the rest of the world, into its own literary bubble, combined with the redirection of thought into rigid interpretation and understanding of reality, becomes the characterisation of the Western conceptual-machines. These conceptual-machines are like sticky webs because, since each concept mutually supports the other concept in its description of reality, if one attempts to challenge a given concept at a time, unsystematically, then other concepts will eventually reconstruct the concept once challenged into a new form. Hence it is extremely difficult to escape the sticky web because each concept, if only individually questioned, only more often than not leads into the repackaging of the challenged concept in different structures which still maintains the same general idea. Since these conceptual-machines become the very things determining what reality is, rather than reality determining the concepts, they obtain a special dominant power, they obtain their own realism where no alternative can be imagined to the concepts that form parts of the entire machine.

These conceptual-machines form the basis of the productive powers of modern day academic philosophy, which exists within an increasingly taller and unreachable ivory-tower. Since the conceptual-machines tends towards determining reality rather than reality determining the concepts, it becomes a productive factory for the concepts and conceptual-tools required to promote the status-quo. Each conceptual-tool, due to existing as part of the functions performed by the literary bubble, will therefore directly construct a heavily standardized product from a normalized blueprint which can barely be deviated from. Deviance from the inevitable standardization and rigidification of legitimate forms of conceptualisation will lead into the liability for these illegitimised forms of conceptualisation to be attacked and dismantled. As such, there is a process of constant delegitimization of forms of thought existing outside a normalized, centralized position of both implicitly and explicitly acceptable philosophy, as such it causes the depowering and ignorance of deviant philosophications. Whoever has the most influential and privileged positions in society become the ones more capable of determining the exact composition and functioning of the Western conceptual-machines, meaning that academic philosophy becomes strongly favorable towards those with power, status, and privilege in society. Thus minority philosophications and the minority voice becomes unhearable in the overwhelming noise that the conceptual-machines can produce.

This makes Western philosophy highly vulnerable to being hijacked by Capitalist flows of coding which redirects academic philosophication as another aspect of the assemblage of the Capitalist machines. Philosophication, as a tool for the Capitalist system, is about the justification and defense of Capitalism, the advancement of Capitalist capital and power accumulation, and the discussion of the specifics of Capitalist ideals and policies. Capitalist philosophication forwards the power accumulation of Capitalism by enabling conceptualisation to become commodified,

becoming a new form of value production, generating a Capitalist conceptual-economics with the sole purpose of producing new value. This new value comes in the form of a hyper-reification of Capitalism, as though Capitalism itself simply expressed the nature of the reality of socio-economics, and the theologification of Capitalism which exalts Capitalism into its own religion, its own cult.

φ2: Philosophical Inversion

The many dichotomies contained in Western philosophy contain the seeds to their own blossoming destruction, their own annihilation, but they also contain the fruits of their reconstruction into becoming two poles of a conceptual spectrum. This conceptual spectrumisation destroys the singularised interpretation of the concepts as they can no longer be isolated into a pinpoint abstracted away from the world, instead the determination of the nature of the concept that will manifest in a given instance will be down to how other entities reflect in what way the concept will manifest. This is because as the old concepts, being reinterpreted as two poles of a spectrum, therefore must be interpreted in retrospect of the entire conceptual spectrum taken as a whole. This is since the spectrum contains a smooth continuity of points, ways entities can manifest, and thus they introduce degrees of indeterminacy and uncertainty to how the nature of those entities are understood. These degrees of indeterminacy and uncertainty provides room for many possible interpretations, inverting the closing off of thought in traditional Western academic philosophy into the expansion of thought and the opening up of thought, creating open-ended conceptualisations of the world. This becomes the basis for an entire paradigm shift in philosophy, and the full consequences of this paradigm shift which moves away from seeing the world in terms of dichotomies, into seeing the world in terms of spectrums, cannot be seen until we begin doing philosophy applying this new paradigm.

The technique of philosophical inversion involves the critique of a dichotomy such as being/non-being by demonstrating the inadequacy of the concept’s ability to ground itself, due to some insufficiency or incoherence the concept has. Then using this, one demonstrates how it requires the spectrumisation of the dichotomy with a re-interpretation of the concepts within the dichotomy, such that they are two poles of a spectrum. This conceptual spectrum is demonstrated as being far more effective than the conceptual dichotomy because it is self-grounded and allows for inevitable indeterminacy, hence having an open-endedness that the dichotomy could never have. The conceptual spectrum can be shown to be a more powerful and effective tool for understanding the world around oneself. Inversion has two stages, a dismantling of the concepts presented to us, and a re-assembling of those concepts into a new structure through their re-interpretation as parts of a spectrum, with the addition of new parts to assemble the thought structures together into a more powerful machine.

The second technique for the analysis and reconfiguration of concepts which goes hand in hand with inversion is conceptual-transversality. This is inspired by the idea that different ontological universes can communicate to each other in biunivocal correspondences, thus transcending each others ontological limitations to assemble together into larger ontological assemblages or as I'd refer it as, an ontological multiverse. The way one ontological universe captures another ontological universe, say an information package A' came from A and B captured A', then the transformation is irreversible since B will already have transformed A' by interpreting A' in its own way,

making A' into the package B'. Conceptual-transversality involves transcending the limitations of a conceptual-universe with its built in rules, by interpreting such a universe via an alternative conceptual-universe, changing information package A' into package B', but the alternative universe in turn interprets a package B' into A'. The effect of this would be merely comparing theories with other theories, except that we use inversion to underpin the assumptions and limitations baked into both universes A and B, to give us this new secondary standpoint C for which both theories A and B can be both analyzed on their own terms and in terms of each other. This enables a controlled means of transcending both conceptual-universes so that, as they have been connected together on a common ground, we can reinterpret both A and B in terms of a new theory C that unites both of them in a larger conceptual assemblage which becomes greater then the sum of its parts.

Using the two techniques together, we can develop a new paradigm of philosophy which acts in direct challenge to Western academic philosophy. We are overthrowing deterministic and absolute truth philosophy, in which we try to find the nature of reality as being one exact way that it truly is, constructing ideas together like a building. Meanings are expressed and reinterpreted in new lights, giving rise to alternative understandings due to how they are transformed within new ontological universes. Instead of attempting to crystallize concepts into a solidified theory that remains stuck in place like a building, concepts must be treated like tools of thought primarily, they are ways of perceiving, understanding, analyzing, and constructing our worlds. To try and enforce a determined interpretation of a concept is to hijack the ambiguities of the meaning and language of a concept to pick apart definitive yet misleading questions to ask about the concept, for instance, whether or not the past and future, "actually exist."

Our paradigm shift moves philosophy away from attempts to produce truths about everything in a totalizing theory and instead focusing on the articulation of new tools, techniques, and methodologies. The truths that my philosophy does produce, it produces because it has applied those tools to describe aspects of reality in a deeper way. Concepts are a series of tools we can use, which when combined with materials, enables us the capacity to think in new terms and to understand the world around us in new ways. The primary focus is not to discover the nature of the world but instead the capability of assembling or re-assembling the world. The paradigm is to move philosophy away from the rigidification of thought and the removal of thoughts away from the world in literary ivory-towers that exclude other people, and instead enable each and every concept to exist in an open-ended form which can be interpreted in many possible ways and thus used in many possible ways. The interest shifts away from the production of the metaphysical theory and the establishment of absolute meaning and shifts towards a process of the making of a toolbox and the introduction of a meaning creation, to shift philosophy into an Anarchistic format whereby we all become capable of creating new meanings and tools, assembling the thoughts together in a directly-democratic organization of thought. We seize the means of the creation of meaning and philosophizing back to the people. Instead of an avoidance of open-endedness in favor of an increasing tendency towards a closing-off of all thought towards everything else, we promote the tendency of the opening-up of all thought towards creating new meanings of other things. Thus the concern is not that this may lead into incompatible interpretations of concepts that seem to disrupt the concept itself but that a multi-sided, seemingly inconsistent series of understandings for a concept is

natural to conceptualisation itself and is a means both towards the production of unique, more refined and sophisticated tools, and to produce unique perceptions of the world.

ψ2: On Being

φ3: An Analysis Hegelian Being and Nothing

The Hegelian definition of being is that it is purely indeterminate, it is equal to itself and does not have any diversity within itself or reference to anything outside itself, as such, nothing is intuited about it. Nothing is a purely empty determinateness, there is nothing to intuit about it whatsoever, it has equality with itself, and no differentiated-ness within itself. Thus, Hegel finds that being and nothing are one and the same, and thus the truth must not be either being nor nothing. Instead, being passes over into nothing and nothing passes over into being. When we sublate being and nothing, we get becoming, the combination of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. At the same time, however, being and nothing are taken to exist in contrast with one another, as they are taken to be complete opposites of the other. Since being and nothing do not extend towards the other as they both do not make outward reference to anything, it means that to analytically say that both being and nothing are equal to themselves is already refuted within the very definitional structure of being and nothing.

This is because to say that being is equal to being, and that being is equal to nothing, is to make an analytic judgment, however, analyticity is inherently circular. This is because the capacity to say that anything is equal to itself as a definition requires that one is capable of engaging in synonymity. This is because the use of the definition does not suffice since to say that something is equal to another thing does not itself explain the rule that equality suggests. In order to explain equality, one has to make reference to the nature of equality in terms of the different ways one is allowed to use equality, and what it means for us to make a statement of equality. To understand equality, we need to understand the concept of synonymy or interchangeability, whereby we are capable of substituting one term with any other term, such that we obtain the same meaning. Interchangeability, which enables us to substitute a term with another term, to acquire the same meaning, and thus establish an equality, requires us to be capable of extending a term A beyond itself so that we make reference to another term. Hence, being must be capable of referring to nothing so that we can say that being is equal to nothing, as being would be a representation of nothing. If being is a representation of nothing, then it is necessary that being refers to nothing, or outside itself, because if it did not, then saying that being is equal to nothing is an absurd statement. A representation of something, such as say, the word rose being a representation of an actual rose, means that the rose is referring to the actual rose.

This also indicates that for any interchangeability to occur, a term must be capable of representing itself or referring to itself, or representing another term which is synonymous with the former term, as well as being able to extend itself beyond itself. Otherwise, we haven’t defined anything about being or nothing by saying they are equal to themselves because we haven’t defined any functioning rule through that definition, we are instead stating a tautology which does not define anything. The explicit properties that the term contains, such as being, must be the determining factor as to whether or not being is equal to nothing, such that we have this set of properties we’ve

written up for both terms. This set of properties, when taken to be equal to another set of properties, develops an extensionality, implying we can rearrange the elements within each of the sets to get the same results. Being and nothing, by their very definitions, contain the same properties, except that they are arranged differently due to a difference in their interpretation, a difference in the way that we express both of their meanings. If we did no re-arrangement of our interpretation of these terms, we would not then be able to definen being and nothing distinctly, but only copy and paste the definition of being oto nothing.

This means that being and nothing cannot on that basis be defined as equal to each other because we are axiomatically assuming the logical rule of extensionality on our terms being and nothing, an axiom which the definitions of being and nothing themselves are incapable of adequately establishing. In that way, we can entirely strip any notion of equality from the definitions of being and nothing. We cannot say that being is equal to itself, we cannot say that nothing is equal to itself, and we cannot say that being or nothing are equal to each other. Hegel's understanding of being and nothing assumes a principle of identity and equality.

With both being and nothing having no differentiation within themselves, it means that they are both genuses that contain only one singular meaning, rather than multiple meanings. Therefore, being and nothing are both sets with a singular element as the items that they contain, as they have no differentiations within themselves. Now, the determination of whether or not we can formulate a genus using the common characteristics of different singulars together, requires that we are capable of comparing one singular with another singular. Through that comparison, we establish how each singular is or is not equal to each other. In the case of saying that being and nothing have no differentiation within themselves, making the genus contain one singular, this requires that we compare being to itself and nothing to itself, thus we must explain how comparison functions. Now, comparison is closely related to the idea of interchangeability, except rather then the substitution of one term with another, we are taking the properties of one term, replacing it with the properties of the other term, and then mapping the properties of both terms to reveal which properties map onto the other term, and which properties fail to map onto the other term. Thus, when we are comparing being with itself, we are mapping the properties being contained back into the properties it can have, which is back to itself. Now, since being can be said to be purely indeterminate, it means we have no specified properties whatsoever, which maps right back onto another set of unspecified properties. Nothing, as a purely empty determinateness, has no properties, so we are mapping no properties back onto itself.

Here, we need to bare in mind that just because being and nothing have no notion of equality, does not mean that we cannot map properties that being or nothing has, back towards themselves, it just means that this "mapping" as it were does not establish a rule of equality. Mapping doesn't involve interchangeability, so it doesn't involve the extension of a term beyond itself. However, it still requires that we are capable of generating reference points, if our map of one set of properties to another didn't involve a reference of one thing to another, then we would not be mapping anything at all. The ability to differentiate necessitates that we are capable of at least potentially referring one thing to another in a comparative action. Now, although being and nothing don't make reference to anything outside themselves, thus meaning that to say they are equal to themselves doesn't define any functional rule of equality whatsoever and is a

statement that is reduced to a mere tautology, thus meaning nothing, they can still refer to themselves. Now, being and nothing compared to themselves takes themselves as the reference point, because they can't refer to anything else outside themselves, which means that we can show that they are undifferentiated entirely within themselves. This is because, as nothing is a purely empty determinateness, it has no properties within itself, and as being is purely indeterminate, it does not specify any properties.

Now, being may not specify any properties, yet being in its pure indeterminateness, says that "there are properties" which happens to be taken as itself in its own arbitrariness, whilst nothing has no properties within itself, it says that, "there are no properties." if we attempt to remove the concept of there being any determinateness or property away from being, then we get nothing, empty determinateness or the state of there being no properties. As a result, the definition of being and nothing requires the prior assumption that there we can affirm and negate something, being affirms properties whilst nothing negates properties. It is because being is an affirmative term whilst nothing is a negative term that they are equal to each other in Hegelian terms, yet absolutely opposite and antagonistic to each other. Since affirmation and negation cannot be understood except in contrast with one another, it means that the definitions of being and nothing cannot mean anything unless being is directly contrasted with nothing and nothing contrasts with being. If the terms refer only to themselves, they mean nothing, which means though they do not explicitly refer to the other, they implicitly refer to each other. Yet they were defined to have no reference to the other, being solidly defined within themselves. The meanings of being and nothing, and how they obtain those meanings contradict themselves.

As a result, neither Hegelian being or nothing can sufficiently ground themselves, due to the internal contradictions in meaning they imply within each other. Their definitions are built off assumptions that identity and equality are forms that concepts have that already exist. Being and nothing assume that their are notions of affirmation and negation, and to be able to transform the passing over of being and nothing into becoming, to thus say that there is a coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, requires that we assume being and nothing are equal to each other, yet exist in total contrast with the other, and further assume we can sublate these terms to something that no longer contradicts itself. The assumption of sublation is grounded on the assumption of equality and identity, which means that the entire Hegelian dialectic of affirmation, negation, and sublation are based off of axioms baked into the meanings of being and nothing which are unproven and were not made explicit firsthand. However, by making the assumptions baked into the definitions of being and nothing hidden and implicit, rather then explicitly declaring those assumptions, it allows the substantiation of a binary and an exact, rigid interpretation of being and nothing, so that the resolution of the conflict between the terms is given itself a rigid interpretation and thus a singular direction it can go.

φ4: Affirmation and Negation

Since being and nothing exist in absolute contrast with each other, baking into themselves the notions of affirmation versus negation as the dichotomy being and nothing exist in. We can interpret affirmation and negation as not involving any notion of equality but rather as being primitive modal forms that entities can exhibit, which cannot obtain any further explanation or definition. This would render Hegel's

deduction of becoming as superfluous because it is trying to obtain a concept of becoming by over-bloating how we describe affirmation and negation. However, affirmation and negation are not sufficiently grounded in themselves because, as primitive modal forms, they require their absolute contrast with each other to perform their function of categorizing entities appropriately that they are meant to do, otherwise, they mean nothing else. This is a major inadequacy on the part of affirmation and negation because, when we consider what it would mean for an entity to be affirmed or negated, and how we determine whether an entity has been affirmed or negated, we are stuck with simply having to declare that "it is simply the case that…" based off of other entities which exist which are supposed to tell us whether or not a given entity can be affirmed or denied. We cannot use an entity itself to sufficiently affirm or deny the entity, as we can never have the entity itself, unless it is about our direct experiences. Only in the case where we are dealing with entities, that is, just our direct experiences, do we have access to the entity itself, enabling us to strictly determine that the entity/experience is or the entity/experience is not.

We must use other entities surrounding a given entity we want to affirm or negate as existing or not existing, as we are using other entities we have direct access to, to tell us something about entities that we do not have such access to. For instance, if we want to affirm or negate the existence of gravity, since we cannot directly experience gravity itself, we have to take reference to something else, experienceable effects that gravity has. It is through the experience of those effects that allows us to determine whether or not we affirm or negate gravity, but because we never have direct access to gravity itself, we can never establish with certainty whether or not gravity exists. With increasingly subjective, more ambiguous, and deeper entrenched in interpretation our theories become about the nature of something, the more indeterminate the truthood or falsehood of the theory is, and the more complex the epistemology behind the theory becomes. Thus the more the act of affirming or negating something about the entities the theory talks about becomes.

Due to this, affirmation and negation as primitive modal categories can be challenged and usurped. Since entities can only be affirmed or negated in reference to other entities, and in reference to a methodology which applies the other entities surrounding the given entity we want to affirm or deny, in someway to perform that function, it means that entities need to be used to mutually determine each other's ontologies, the ontology isn't determined within itself. Since there is the interpretive subjectivity that comes along with each entity having its ontological structure being constructed due to how it relates to other ontological structures, it brings into question that being and non-being can be defined in such a binary at all. Furthermore, it is this very binary view of being, this is and this is not, that leads into a circularity of what truth is, because it is firstly, predicated off of analyticity, since it must be predicated off of definitional equality, which itself can be shown to be a circular dead-end. To say that something "is" doesn't explain what it means for something to be true, if we say that truth is what "is."

Affirmation and negation are deeply an aspect of truth and falsehood, since truth and falsehood express a reinterpretation of affirmation and negation away from its metaphysical roots to its epistemological manifestation, that we can assign a truth-value to something. Our ability to assign a truth-value onto a proposition that states something requires us to understand how this assignment works, since we cannot explain the meaning of what it means for something "to be" by simply saying that "it is." Since we

need to understand how we assign truth-values onto different propositions, we might say that we need to justify the connection. However, justification itself needs to be explained by a paradigm telling us how we are meant to appropriately justify propositions, which means that we are writing a program that tells us that X is true if… As such, a justificationist view on whether or not we affirm or deny something is insufficient because it is conceptually shallow, it it points that we need to have a paradigm describing how we make the connections needed to assign truth-values, but does not tell us anything about the construction of those paradigms themselves. We're still being choked by the binary of "is" and "is not."

Thus the binary of affirmation and negation is severely restricted in its scope, seemingly only applicable to answering questions about our direct experiences, that is simply, what are we or aren't we experiencing right now. When it comes to anything outside of immediate experiences, the concept of affirmation and negation becomes a heavy stranglehold on our ability to understand the world around us because we are perpetually struggling against heavily limiting ideas. However, affirmation and negation contain within themselves the potential to be spectrumized because they express themselves the potential to be re-interpreted as two poles of a new spectrum. Since affirmation is immediately applied to saying that one is having an experience, it means that it is a pure actualized experience. On the other hand, negation, as immediately applied to experience, is to say that one is not having an experience, thus making it a purely unactualized experience. Yet, what a purely unactualized experience, is still an experience that can potentially occur, and thus we can re-interpret the negation of an experience, as simply meaning that this experience could possibly occur if our current experiences change, it is hence purely virtual.

φ5: Guattari's Actuality and Virtuality

In Schizoanalytic Cartographies, Guattari introduces his four-headed metaphysics in the form of a two-dimensional coordinate graph with four quadrants. One of those axes was the actual versus the virtual, which expressed the degree of discursivity that an ontology had with other ontologies. The degree of discursivity of an ontology means, how much a given ontology manifests in other ontologies in some way. Thus an actualized ontology is simply one that is manifested in lots of ways through lots of different ontologies, so the actualization of gravity is demonstrated through how it manifests in many particular instances of our experiences we can point to. A virtual ontology is one that doesn't manifest in other ontologies at all, so mathematical concepts would be an example, as they exist simply in the abstract without being reflected by any other ontology, simply existing in-themselves. Now, virtual ontologies, because they are self-contained entities that do not exist within the mesh of other ontologies, are more knowable but less locatable then actual ontologies. They are more knowable because, as long as one knows what a given virtual ontology means, then it becomes much easier to derive the particular consequences of the meanings they have. As such, mathematics, being examples of purely virtual ontologies, as they contain an empty determinateness in relation to themselves and only a determinateness in relation to how they abstractly have relationships to each other, can be known and decided with exact precision. On the other hand, the more actual the ontology, the more locatable and less knowable it becomes. This is because the actual ontology can be located in increasingly more ontologies which interact with the given actual ontology, yet the actual ontology is increasingly embedded into the mesh of other ontologies and is entirely realized or

manifested through those other ontologies, thus the actual ontology is “buried” underneath the other ontologies it is manifesting through.

Hegel’s general ideas about being and nothing are thus the absolute poles of the spectrum of actuality to virtuality in Guattari’s metaphysics, thus Guattari’s metaphysics already pre-contains the being/nothing splitting within Hegel’s metaphysics. Since being is purely indeterminate and does not contain anything to intuit about it, yet being is meant to be the purest abstraction, it means that being can be located within any ontology whatsoever, yet at the same time, nothing can be known about being. Since anything manifests being, being cannot be given any proper definition whatsoever, and as a result, being represents the absolutely actual. On the other hand, nothing, which is a purely empty determinateness with nothing to intuit about it, is absolutely virtual, because it does not manifest in any way in any other ontology. Nothing is absolutely unlocatable because any ontology which is not nothing, cannot be nothing, yet it is infinitely knowable, because there is nothing to know about nothing, we automatically know everything there is to know about nothing once we understand the abstract concept of nothing. Hence being is infinitely discursive, whilst nothing is infinitely non-discursive. Now, when we turn pure being and nothing into the terms of affirmation versus negation, to do directly with our experiences, then we find that our experiences are split into dealing with both the absolutely actual and absolutely virtual.

This is because any experience we have, simply “is,” and thus can be a definitional expression of Hegel’s being, meaning that whatever experience we talk about having, is purely indeterminate, we cannot determine at all a definition for our experiences at all. What is behind our experiences is infinitely unknowable because there is no escape from our experiences, in order for us to know something, it must refer back to an experience of knowing something, we will always describe our experiences in terms of other experiences. Yet our experiences are infinitely locatable, since whatever we are experiencing, is right in front of us this whole time. Thus, it makes no sense for us to say that our experience corresponds to this or that description, as the truth about the experience, because those descriptions both do not define the experience, nor can it produce any knowledge about the exact experience itself, but only the experience as it might be generally shared with other people having the same experience. At the same time, any experience we are not having is infinitely knowable, because we can easily affirm or deny that we are having a given experience, yet infinitely unlocatable, we cannot tell which range of experiences we are not having.

Since being and nothing exist in absolute contrast with each other, they need the other to ground the meaning of the other side. We cannot simply resolve this problem by redefining the nature of the being-ness of an ontology in terms of degrees of discursivity. This is because, contained in the idea of infinite discursivity, is simply that an ontology manifests in all other ontologies, this tells us nothing specific enough about the nature of the infinitely discursive ontology. Mathematical concepts are technically in another light, infinitely discursive, because say, the natural numbers, always appear to be represented by any other ontologies which exist. They are purely actual in that sense. On the other hand with the pure virtuality that mathematical concepts have taken in their own internal meanings, these internal meanings still exist in reference to other ontologies, so that these mathematical concepts can exist in raw, abstract relationships. Nothing in mathematical concepts contains the ideas of being or nothing in the Hegelian

sense, they only contain the concept of determinatenesses that are empty beyond the relationship they exist with each other. This means that being and nothing exist as extreme limits on Guattari's spectrum of actuality and virtuality, they can never be reached by increasing the discursivity of an ontology or decreasing the discursivity, but represent a maximum possible discursivity or non-discursivity like two end-points defined on the spectrum.

These two end-points do not exist within the spectrum as conceived of as two rays going in opposite directions from the center, but are rather special additions to the spectrum. Those two end-points, being and nothing, of pure affirmation and pure negation, exist as the dichotomous absolutes of that spectrum. They represent the blacks and whites of actuality and virtuality. When we say that being and nothing are one and the same, we are saying that the meaning of one substantiates the meaning of the other in such a way that the meanings of both of them are exactly the same in terms of their content yet absolutely opposite in terms of the nature of the ontology they represent. Being and nothing are points that represent the absolute infinities of Guattari's spectrum. The addition of any more discursivity at the endlessly infinite point only leads right back into the same point again since the amount can no longer be increased, the subtraction of any less discursivity at the endlessly negatively infinite point that nothing exists in, again, leads back into the same point again, since it cannot be decreased further.

Since Hegel's being and nothing are taken as being in dialectical opposition with each other, instead of resolving this dialectical opposition by collapsing the two together in their own equivalency, into a singularised point of becoming, we can explode being and nothing into a spectrum of actuality and virtuality. This is because we can say that, since absolute actuality and absolute virtuality exist in dialectical tension with each other due to being the same and yet absolute opposites of each other, it means that there must be an in-between of absolute actuality and absolute virtuality. This is because absolute actuality and absolute virtuality, by indicating manifestation in all ontologies, versus manifestation in no ontologies, implies the notion of manifestation in only some ontologies. This idea of manifestation in only some ontologies implies the idea of Guattarian discursivity versus non-discursivity, which contains every in-between, between absolute actuality and absolute virtuality that may exist. Thus our analysis leads to this end-result, whereby even within the rules of the Hegelian dialectic, it indicates that being and nothing can be interpreted in a new way to lead into a spectrum of discursivity, not just a collapse of the terms into a singularised point of becoming.

ψ3: Network-Logic

φ6: The Link Between Becoming and Deterritorialization-Reterritorialization

Hegelian becoming is derived from dialectically resolving the contradictions between being and nothing, that being and nothing contain one and the same content, as becoming, where being passes over into nothing and nothing passes over into being. This passing over of being into nothing and nothing into being is known as a coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. Yet being and nothing exist in absolute contrast with each other, which means that this becoming represents a vanishing of being into its opposite state and a vanishing of nothing into its own opposite state. However, becoming represents

not only this, but a collapse into singularity of the two end-points in Guattari's spectrum of actuality and virtuality. Here, these two end-points of absolute actuality are taken to be the same as absolute virtuality, which is taken to be the same as absolute actuality, and so on, in this passing over into the other action. There is a transformation in the way in which being manifests in other ontologies, going from manifesting in all ontologies, to manifesting through no ontologies. This is a folding-up of the end-points into an entirely unique ontological existence. If we extend this folding-up of being and nothing into a singular point, becoming, to all other possible discursivities that ontologies may have, we are then saying that ontologies change the ontologies they manifest through, they no longer manifest in some ontologies, and instantly manifest in new ontologies again. This reformulates the meaning of an ontology manifesting in other ontologies, as those other ontologies becoming the territories through which an ontology manifests and realizes itself. This simultaneously generates a simple becoming which represents deterritorialization or ceasing-to-be, where the territories an ontology manifests through vanishes, and yet at the same time expresses reterritorialization, where the territories an ontology manifests through appears.

Hence we come to understand that the passing over of being into nothing itself is an absolute deterritorialization and absolute reterritorialization, represented by the concepts of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. This means that we have a spectrum of territorialization-deterritorialization by perceiving how the singularized becoming can be spectrumized into a spectrum of becoming, the same way being and nothing can be spectrumized into actuality and virtuality. From this, we can fully demonstrate precisely where Hegelian and Guattarian metaphysics cross over with each other through the use of conceptual-transversality. As we have viewed Hegelian metaphysics in terms of Guattarian metaphysics, and Guattarian metaphysics through the eyes of Hegelian metaphysics, by using new interpretations of the texts the metaphysics exists in, we have demonstrated a unification of the two into a grander ontological universe. Within this larger conceptual-assemblage, we have demonstrated lines of conceptualizations which unites linear dialectical logic with nonlinear machinic or cartographical logic. This combination of the two logics together is why I called my work dialectical-cartographies, since we are combining dialectical logic with cartographical logic into one greater logic.

$\varphi 7$: Multiplicity and Something

When we determine what is real and what is a possibility, with the real, we are saying that it has an existence within given ontologies, whilst with a possibility, it does not exist within other ontologies but might be contained within other ontologies. Due to deterritorialization and reterritorialization, it means that whenever territories that manifest given ontologies disappear, there is always the coming-to-be or re-manifestation of those ontologies in new territories. Hence what is "real" can be captured by what is embedded deeply within territories, whilst what is "possible" is captured by what is not embedded within any territories and therefore has a greater potential to be embedded in new territories. This leads us to being able to define four quadrants within our spectrumized metaphysics. The quadrants in Guattari's metaphysics are called the flux of actual real, phylum of actual possibility, universe of virtual possibility, and territories of virtual real. Now, the actual and the virtual are states of being, but they themselves do not express the concept of absolute actuality and absolute virtuality as found in the meanings of pure being and nothing. Becoming in

Hegelian terms involves a coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in which absolute actuality leaps over into absolute virtuality. This creates two states, an infinitely discursive state which is referenced by one thing, being, of which being is found to be infinitely non-discursive within the contentful meaning it contains due to it being purely indeterminate, revealing itself to have an equivalency to nothing, which is an absolute virtuality. This absolute virtuality is reflected in an infinitely referring item, pure being infinitely refers to all other ontologies, at the same time, it doesn't specifically reference any other particular ontology, it refers to almost nothing specific but almost always makes endless reference in general. Nothing refers to only itself, because it cannot refer to anything else, and nothing is the singular item referenced in itself, and so nothing as a pure virtuality reflects this common equivalency with being, that the only particular ontology being references is itself.

Using the concept of discursivity, we are therefore able to delineate precisely where the absolute opposition of nothing and being exist in, it is that nothing does not reference anything in general at all, except itself, whilst being references everything in general except itself. Nothing and being have the equivalency that due to their lack of any contentful determination, they both do not reference anything particular except themselves. We therefore have an infinite generality in contrast with an infinite non-generality. Thus when we say that being passes over into nothing and nothing passes over into being, we are expressing that being, existing in this infinitely general sense, determines nothing at all, and nothing, which is infinitely non-general, also determines nothing. This non-determination means that both being and nothing do not assemble anything at all with almost all other ontologies due to their empty purity, and thus are extreme points which represent entities which can only assemble with each other. Being and nothing assemble with each other through the fact that both express non-determinations, and thus are found to pass over into the other through an equivalency, hence being is assembling with nothing and nothing with being so that they mutually affirm and negate the other, due to their need for each other to mutually define the other. Becoming, as coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, is a concept which singularises the complete assemblage and finalized production that results from such assemblage that being and nothing have with each other. This becoming represents a sublation, that is, the preservation of the concepts contained within the assemblage of those concepts put together, after the machinery that is developed from the assemblage undergoes internal conflicts with itself, its own negation, causing it to breakdown, that generates this new product.

Becoming is therefore analogous to dis-assembling and reassembling that occurs in deterritorialization and reterritorialization. In our two spectrums, we have the two axes which are called discursivity and territorialization. We take a further sublation from becoming, whereby we preserve the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of becoming, by taking a snapshot of this ontology in a process whereby we take the product of the dis-assembling and reassembling process of the old machinery that the ontologies were part of, to give us a new state of assemblage for our given ontology. This state of assemblage gives us the degree to which our ontology is assembled with other ontologies, and how that assemblage has been formed, such that we have a determinate machinery. Now this determinate machinery collapses the infinite speeds contained within becoming into a singularity, such that the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are no longer taken as passing over into the other but are instead taken as two sides of the same coin, that coin being the functioning of a determinate machine that an ontology is a part

of. The ontology has a determinateness to it or a quality, since in order for us to collapse becoming in this way such that the collapse represents the nature of ontological machinery, we have to assemble determinate ontologies together rather then ontologies that have either a pure indeterminateness or empty determinateness. This is because if we were to deal with only an empty determinateness or pure indeterminateness, we no longer have a machinery that deals with the dis-assembling and reassembling of many ontological components that transverse across each other discursively. We instead have a being and a nothing which assemble together in such a way as to collapse within their own singularity into a coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, which is becoming.

Thus, quality is a determinate being. Whilst becoming represents movement along the axis of territorialization, quality represents a specific coordinate on the cartographical plane. Now, whilst becoming reflects pure movement itself, without specifying anything about the actual degree of movement that is occurring, merely that moving is occurring, quality reflects rigid positioning on our graph. Due to the positioning of quality, quality emphasizes both its actuality along the graph or the degree to which it manifests and how it manifests, reflecting the reality that quality obtains for itself. At the same time, quality is positioned in regards to a degree of virtuality that it is, thus, what quality does not manifest through and thus what recesses into the background for quality, it is not just what quality is not, but what the quality could have been, and so what we can add to quality. Thus we express the deficiencies within a quality or what quality could also assemble with, hence being quality's negation. Hence negation is nothing more than a reflection of what an ontology has not assembled has, and thus possibilities the ontology has not obtained because those possibilities have not been actualized yet, something different for that ontology has been actualized. Quality is therefore a positioning alongside the actuality-virtuality, but doesn't specify where the positioning is. Since quality is the complete collapse of the infinite speeds of becoming into a singularity that does not specify any speeds at all, we cannot say anything about where a quality would be positioned alongside the axis of territorialization.

If we were to go through the concept of quality using a Hegelian dialectical approach, we would say that quality's reality and negation are still being mediated, and thus the next step is to take them into a vanishing instance as two sides of the same coin, a something. This is effectively to collapse the actuality/virtuality of the quality as simply representing an aspect of the positioning of quality, such that something is simply "to be placed alongside the spectrum of discursivity" without reference to degrees of actuality and virtuality. Since reality and negation are taken as distinct from each other, and thus mediated with each other, despite being united within the concept of quality, there is no concept that reality is passing over into negation or negation into reality. Reality and negation do not have any equivalency within themselves, they are grounded polar opposites that simply reflect the opposite directions one may go alongside the spectrum of discursivity, reality being actualization, negation being virtualization. This is problematic for Hegel's account of how reality and negation, taken in their unity, can be collapsed and taken to be something, because reality and negation reference each other not in terms of an equivalency like being or nothing, but only semiotically. What is said can be used as a signification for what has not been said, indirectly, by considering what is not contained in what has not been said, the negative space, whilst the negative space itself, the omission, can in turn signify what is being said in-between the lines. The positive space.

Hegel's dialectical thinking presents a limitation. We could unify being and nothing into becoming precisely because we could understand how the opposition and unification of being and nothing occurred due to their intrinsic meaning and how they would externally assemble into the ontological machinery required to support dialectical progression. With reality and negation, we have specified only that negation in general specifies the limitations of a quality, whilst reality outlines what a quality in fact, contains. By saying that reality and negation determines the determinateness of the quality itself by the fact that they represent what the quality is and is not, is only to say of the being and nothing that quality has. The quality as a crystallized position alongside the spectrum of discursivity, which has collapsed becoming, collapses the notion of movement itself into a static fixture. To understand how to sublate quality into a higher ontology, we have to understand that quality doesn't undergo a transformation into something through the unification of reality and negation into an immediacy which is nothing, but undergoes a transformation because the degree to which it is territorialized remains entirely unspecified due to its failure to contain any becoming. The mediation between reality and negation is not in a static sense but in a dynamic sense, reality and negation reflect the territories that quality is embedded in with other ontologies as it manifests through those ontologies, taken in their true unification, show that quality must also have a specified position alongside the territorialization axis. This provides us with the quality in terms of what is also embedded within its assembling, which gives us a multiplicity. It is from this point that we diverge from Hegalian metaphysics, because the multiplicity, as reflecting the assembling and embedding of ontologies with each other to form machinery.

Thus Hegelian metaphysics progresses by treating the world like a logical language, especially a logical language which progresses through the generation of conceptual binaries, the collapse of mutually incompatible conceptual binaries into a conceptual singularity, and the re-generation of conflicting conceptual binaries through what is contained within the conceptual singularity. The dialectical progression is itself expressed along this basic formula, from affirmation, to negation, to sublation or the negation of the negation. It is a logical language, not a logical machinery. As a logical language, it does not rely solely on intrinsic equivalencies that ontologies have with each other, such as the intrinsic equivalency of being and nothing together. If it did so, then, since reality and negation do not have such an intrinsic equivalency, reflecting opposite directions alongside discursivity, actualization being the direction reality represents, and virtualization being the direction negation represents, then Hegelian logic could not sublate reality and negation into something by taking each other in their unity. Instead, the language relies on external equivalencies that ontologies have with each other. Reality and negation have an external equivalency with each other because reality and negation imply each other. Reality and negation do not refer to the same aspects of quality, as such they are not intrinsically equivalent to each other via how they define ontologies but rather logically related to each other via how the reality of an ontology obtains the meaning of its negation and vice-versa. Hence, to take reality and negation in their immediacy to generate something in Hegelianism, is to view an ontology as an entirely crystallized, static unit, which evolves linearly according to its own internal rules, rather then how it assembles and embeds itself in other ontologies. To declare there is a distinct something which does not regard concepts of assemblage or embedding, is the point where the idea of multiplicity is rejected.

Hence something in Hegelianism represents the point where we are dealing with linear logic, the strict structuralization of a concept such that one interpretation is the true meaning of the concept. Linear logic always evolves out of something, an X which is a determinate being that reflects both its reality and negation concentrated into one point, such that we erase all notions of the spectrums of discursivity and territorialization. X is taken as it is in a singularised meaning, rather than having a multiplicity of meaning that involves many alternative possible interpretations. The alternative of multiplicity explodes the singularisation of reality and negation, the ontological grounding that the given ontology we are concerned with is embedded in, into a spectrum of territorialization or embedding. In contrast, something takes itself as entirely embedded within an absolute point, a fixture X which becomes the foundation for determinate philosophy generally. Since multiplicity assembles, re-assembles, embeds and re-embeds in relationships to ontologies, multiplicity is diffuse in its interpretations and its meanings, its diffusibility into multiple determinatenesses means that it cannot be viewed as manifold expressions of a single concept. The something, the X, is a transcendent unity of reality and negation, by operating as a higher concept above the distinctness of reality and negation. Multiplicity operates as an immanent substrate.

φ8: The Concept Of Network-Logic

Multiplicity itself has discursivity and territorialization. We take multiplicity as constantly transforming due to a becoming, or deterritorialization and reterritorialization, and this becoming for multiplicity is a specific speed for which multiplicity deterritorializes and reterritorializes. Importantly however, as a multiplicity becomes embedded in new territories, it assembles in new territories, and thus the degree of discursivity can change for this multiplicity. Instead of then, simply viewing the transformation rhizomatic structures undergo in a singular dimension of speed, since the becoming of a multiplicity changes the qualities contained within that multiplicity and therefore potentially its discursivity, we see becoming as a two-dimensional vector. Becoming not only transforms multiplicity through diffusing it along space, hence unfolding it throughout bodies of ontologies, as can be found in Deleuzian metaphysics, becoming also transforms multiplicity by its durations throughout time, thus its unfolding through reifications and de-reifications as can be found in Hegelian metaphysics. Becoming does not reflect just a pure non-linear logic by which ontologies embed and re-embed perpetually throughout bodies of ontologies, in an ever unfolding, and newly folding dynamic, nor a purely linear logic by which an ontology leads into another ontology through de-reification and new reification. Linearity and nonlinearity itself exists within a spectrum in the nature of the becoming that ontologies are placed under, with pure nonlinearity being rhizomatic logic, linearity being, arborescent, hierarchical logic, one point to the other in a succession or duration.

Within a folding and unfolding of a multiplicity undergoing becoming in a spacetime, there are many distinct durations crossing over with each other to generate many directions and possible transformations that machinic assemblages can undergo simultaneously. Becoming where the linearity/nonlinearity of logic has been spectrumized, develops logic from the rhizomatic/hierarchical dichotomy, the any points to any points structure versus given point to given point structure, into a logic involving a network of assemblages all transforming together. This network, takes points with many possible tracings, there are many possible ways we can order points to go towards each other, and furthermore, points can be ordered in terms of their

priorities, that is, how fast the becoming of one point to another point occurs. Becoming then, does not deal with a strict dichotomy of affirmation and negation, but rather in terms of the degrees of harmony and tension within aspects of the way a machine changes over time. That is, the greater the harmony the parts of the machine have with each other, the slower the becoming of the machine is, and the greater the tension those parts have with each other, the faster the machine is breaking down to transform into another machine. With Hegel's purely hierarchical, linear logic, becoming could only exist in an infinitely fast form, machines breakdown immediately in Hegelianism such that the parts of the machine become only moments or new parts for the new machine Hegelianism constructs. It makes a dialectical progression at infinite speeds of reification and de-reification that occurs until the point where the destruction of the machine becomes synonymous with the reconstruction of the machine, thus reaching the absolute Idea or ultimate point of Hegelianism.

Dialectics in network-logic is not about simply presenting how ontologies contradict each other, but also by underlying the rate at which the consequences of such contradiction is going to play out, in the generation of new machinery those ontologies can assemble into. The dimension of dialectics deals with the reification and de-reification that ontologies are undergoing, whilst the dimension of cartographisation works with the territorialization and deterritorialization that ontologies can undergo. Since multiplicity is always transforming due to becoming, multiplicities are not just defined in terms of their exact discursivity and territorialization at any given point of time, they also contain the rate of change that they are undergoing on the graph, and thus two differentials, the differential of discursivity over time, and the differential of territorialization over time. Thus, these basic concepts that define network-logic serve as a series of foundational instruments that serve as the means through which we can understand any ontological development which occurs around us.

ψ4: Extreme Vector Transformations Of Multiplicity

φ9: Intertextual Deconstruction

The motion of the multiplicity towards different locations on the cartograph, or plane that contains the spectrums of discursivity and territorialization, occurs at different speeds of becoming and in different directions. The location of the multiplicity is marked as ($\mathcal{D}$,$\mathcal{T}$, T), where $\mathcal{D}$ is the discursivity, ranging from positive infinity to zero, $\mathcal{T}$ is the territorialization, ranging from positive infinity to zero, and T is the duration, ranging from zero to infinity. We say that our multiplicity is moving at a speed V where V=($\mathfrak{D}$,$\mathfrak{T}$) where $\mathfrak{D}$ is the speed to which the discursivity changes and $\mathfrak{T}$ is the speed to which the territorialization changes. Now, within any ontological assemblage, there can be many different vectors V. We may have to consider them together in order to establish the full ways in which our given multiplicity M may transform. However, we do not say that M simply transforms as the sum of different vectors together, but we have to graph the different vectors as drawing in multiple different directions simultaneously without accumulating together necessarily. This is because the multiplicity M may re-manifest as many different ontologies, seemingly in conflict with each other, due to the result of the different directions of becoming that M was pulled towards when M was being transformed.

In order for us to determine how a multiplicity M transforms within different series of becomings, we have to understand the various determinatenesses of M as well as the determinatenesses of becoming. Unless we know how the relationship between the determination of M and the determination of its becoming functions, we cannot understand how M is going to transform due to the different vectors of becoming. As a good example of these concepts about multiplicity in action, we can bring up a discussion on Derrida's deconstruction. Derrida's deconstruction relies on the fact that organized signifiers contain degrees of indeterminateness in them that gives rise to internal inconsistencies within their internal logic through the plurality of distinct, conflicting interpretations one can have for the body of text the signifiers construct. This is because organized signifiers which are completely precise in their determinateness so that there is no degree of indeterminateness within the possible ways in which they may mean, such as is often the case in mathematics, results in the signifiers being unable to engage in multiple becomings. Mathematical concepts, when well-defined, can only become in one way such that precise theorems about these organized concepts are developed by necessity. However, Derrida's deconstruction is about challenging texts by showing how they present with conflicting becomings which the text itself did not intend, the text already dismantles itself because in its enunciative feedback-loop right back into itself, it dismantles the ontological assemblages that constructed its very content

The analysis of a text to procure multiple conflicting meanings from it, and thus many conflicting becomings, deterritorializes the organized signifiers away from being the existential territories of centralized meaning that structuralist would view the text as, into a wider realm of possibilities. The once thought stable grounds of meanings that one believed were contained in a given text, hence embedding meaning onto the territories of expression, is flipsided, rather, territories of multiple meanings are embedded on territories of signifiers. There is a constellation of meanings that exist which present a night sky of possible contents we can extract from a body of expressions, the expressions are no longer virtual possibilities but seen as the actualized virtual coding which procures meaning. This is because when the way in which signifiers are organized and the relationships the ambiguous meanings signifiers have with each other, becomes the basis for meaning to be generated in the first place, then replacements in the ways enunciation occurs can change the meanings that are generated. On the structuralist, centralized view of meaning with the meaning being the territories for expressions to be provided to communicate the meaning, then one could easily use multiple forms of expression to communicate more or less the same meaning, because a constellation of possible expressions must be embedded on that same meaning. If that wasn't the case with enunciations, then it would become impossible for a centralized meaning to be communicated across the board, since different machinery which receives the signals will always interpret and transform those signals in different lights to make those signals computable to themselves, or for the meaning to be transferred into new texts to be transformed and used in different ways.

What we have here then, is a binary choice between either centralizing meaning, taking it as the actual territories, whilst decentralizing expressions such that the same units of meaning can be transferred from ontological universe to ontological universe without fundamentally changing. We could instead centralize expression as the generator of multiple meanings, thus decentralizing those meanings, such that the change in expression will always be the deterritorialized embeds for meanings, forcing those

meanings to transform into entirely new contents. The consequence of this is that rather than taking the signifier to be the fixed rock which has specific modes of signification, the signifier, taken as having unstable and fluid meanings, is taken as the actually existing substrate of communication. However, since expression itself contains its own intrinsic meanings or contents which formulate the expression, it means that the expression itself can be uniquely transformed and interpreted in multiple different ways in multiple distinct ontological universes or even within the same ontological universe. The result is that the signifier itself is fluid and unstable, thus the modes of enunciation are decentralized alongside the decentralization of meaning. There is no “body of text” to point to, only the specialized signals and processing of signals that each machine undergoes, which generates changes within the contents of the machine and the further assemblages that a specific ontological universe undergoes with other universes.

The lines between signaletic and contentful forms of language become blurred since they are both ontologically decentralized and machinic by nature. Signaletic forms do not simply exist in terms of already existing assemblages and already existing networks of contrast and deference because those very contrasts and references are subject to fluctuation over time. The notion that signals only produce meanings through the contrast of signs against each other, ignores how the very meanings signals enter into reference with become contents which in turn feedback upon the signals and, due to the assemblages those meanings have with each other, changes the way in which the signals themselves connect with each other to produce meaning. There is no stable origin for a language, the origin of signs cannot be viewed as stably procured through distinct contents which exist that directly develop the signs, nor can distinct meanings be said to be directly developed through the structure of the signs. Rather, there is always a complex interplay of signaletic and contentful bodies, realizing each other through their assemblages and re-assembling, machines of both communication and processing by which the communication and the results of the communication enter into a recursive feedback-loop with each other.

Thus, the analysis of texts are never complete because the deconstruction of the meanings contained within the text by showing how the assemblages of meaning created by the signs in question, ends up resulting in mutually conflicting interpretations, leading into the deterritorialization of the text into many possible meanings only bares the seeds for its own re-territorialization. This re-territorialization is bound to regenerate meaning back into the text in a new form in which the analysis that dismantled the text and the different concepts produced by that analysis to reveal implicit contradictions in the text reconstructs a unique body of meaning for that text altogether. Such reconstruction results in the meaning of the text traversing away from the text altogether in a line of flight spearheaded by the analysis of the text which, driving the reconfiguration of the plateaus of meanings such that the analysis is a new plateau of meaning as part of the entire meaning of the work. The result is only to generate new discursive plateaus with its own new signaletic and contentful structures which themselves have degrees of ambiguity which enables their potential dismantling, the deconstruction of the analysis itself. Conflict always creeps in.

It is not enough in the analysis of a text to consider the signaletic structures involved in the text and how they cause a deterritorialization of meaning into a constellation of meanings, one must also look into how direct contents interplay with signaletic forms. We not only need to understand how the language interacts with itself but how the a-

signifying ontological machines below the language interact with language through its production and processing. The analysis of texts does not exist simply in its abstract forms but also in its concrete forms, the actualization of texts as they traverse across many discursive plateaus to create new signals, meanings, and transformations within itself and the ontologies that make up the discursive plateaus the text runs across. The process of textual analysis must involve the text within an intertextual context such that the many becoming of the text can be explored through its interactions with other texts. This intertextual analysis, which I will call intertextual deconstruction, is interested in revealing the binary modes content enters into itself and its manifestation through other machinery due to the influences of binary categories existing within Western thought. It also discusses the binaries implicated within the ways in which texts interact with other texts which may be hidden under the surface or have slipped through the cracks so as to become imperceptible except upon a much closer reading of those texts.

φ10: The Four Absolute States Being May Be Defined By

The “is” and “is not” dichotomy is used differently in Hegelian logic as opposed to logical atomism, but both approaches to understanding the nature of reality take “is” and “is not” under an absolute reification, embedding “is” and “is not” as the fundamental ontological character of all of reality. This absolute reification functions in opposite directions. In Hegelianism, there is a holistic view of being whereby ‘being’ is taken to be a purely indeterminate substance that forms the fundamental, lowest layer of ontology, such that all higher ‘beings’ can be dialectically inferred through our primary ‘being.’ The end-goal of the dialectic is to reveal every aspect of ‘being’ or ‘reality’ and thus to uncover every moment of the ‘Absolute’ which constitutes all of reality, an ontologically monistic theory. Russel’s logical-atomism is equally ontologically monistic in the opposite direction, instead of all-encompassing holism it participates in absolutely fragmented units of reality, absolute somethings X. These somethings X are entirely isolated, and an atomic proposition, a single true or false fact that can exist without the presence of other atomic units, requires only a predicate/verb representing a quality or relation, and the appropriate names of the individuals that either have the quality or are related to each other in someway. Thus a dichotomy that emerges from the intertextual relationship between Hegel’s being and Russell’s being. Hegel’s being is a monistic holism whereby the nature of the being is infinitely deep but a self-perpetuating singularity, reproduced constantly via the dialectic. On the other hand, Russell’s being is a monistic fragmentism, every atomic proposition or marks what is or is not the case, is isolated from all other atomic propositions, each “is” or being is entirely metaphysically empty and yet being exists endlessly on a surface overlay, an overlay with a binary “yes” “no” for what state each ‘being’ or ‘proposition’ can exist in. Russell’s ontologies are entirely static, thinks simply are or are not, change in Russell’s world exists only itself encoded into being rather than being embedded right into the crux of being.

However, because Hegelian being will dialectically imply all the entirety of its nature dialectically, it means that all things about the nature of that being, that is, all facts about being, due to the various dialectical relationships variants of being has with itself, and the states of becoming being exists in, Hegel’s being can be re-interpreted to belong somewhere on Russell’s surface overlay. Since Hegel’s being and logic is meant to exist as a self-contained state, it means that the entirety of Hegelian being and logic it is coupled with turns the Hegelian ontology into its own special kind of atomic

proposition. Like a set of mathematical axioms that lead into an insanely rich abundance of theorems, the simple acceptance of the “yes” or “no” of whether or not Hegel’s ontology is indeed the correct form of understanding being, is translatable into Russell's logical-atomism. Due to the emptiness of Russell’s being, there is nothing stopping us from taking Hegel’s basic ontological constraints as the qualities of the individual “being.” Hegel contains its own kind of atomism in its holism, in that by being a complete singularity it at the same time becomes a single thing that is the case that is the case independently of anything else that is or is not the case. The only difference is that Hegel constructs a framework so that this single, independent individual ends up containing all things such that there aren’t any exceptional atomic propositions which may exist beyond that given individual. On its own though, translating Hegelian ontology into Russell’s surface overlay does not say anything new about the ontology and exists more of a pedantic roundabout way to express a tautological truism.

What is interesting is that we can break down Hegel’s ontology and take a snapshot of each logical progression that occurs in what he says. Each snapshot itself is treated as an individual. For instance, the statement “nothing, is simply equality with itself,” can be taken in an atomic sense, nothing, the name of the individual, has the quality, being equal to itself. We break down Hegel’s ontology into its tiniest logical fragments such that we can express each abstract statement as an atomic proposition. What does not matter is whether or not the logical fragments have any concrete meaning beyond a simple shuffling of names and relations between the names. What we do care about, is the fact that we can deconstruct Hegel’s philosophy down into a vastly broad surface overlay of true and false atomic propositions, translating each tiny piece into Russell’s logic. This extremely broad but flat overlay would be meaningfully equivalent to the extremely deep but singularised overlay that we made previously with Hegel’s ontology as we translated it into the form of logical atomism. It shows us that Hegel’s “line” is both infinitely long and yet infinitely point-like depending on the perspective we choose to view that line by, it is a “line” which in a sense, has been compacted into an infinitely dense and small circle. A circle in which we are traveling round and round at infinite speeds and where we are traveling through each step simultaneously, like a maddening carousel. A maddening carousel with such infinite speeds engineered into it via its fundamental components, the split between being and nothing, traversing into the other at infinite speeds of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be as being flips into the polar opposite of its hyper-discursivity into nothing’s non-discursivity. Hegel’s philosophy traps itself in a paradoxical condition, it is both entirely embedded within itself and yet its infinite speeds to which it transforms to its other moments, all of which occur simultaneously, makes it entirely un-embedded within itself at once. The whole dialectical becoming of Hegelian philosophy exists with this paradox conditioned into it. It succeeds in saying both everything and nothing.

To more fully unravel this paradoxical status of everything and nothing we must reflect Hegel’s God with its self-same yet inverted expression, Aquinas’s God. Whilst Hegel’s God is proven through a framework that allows us to begin with the lowest being before dialectically approaching the highest being, God. Aquinas goes in the opposite direction yet similarly to Hegel, aims to incorporate the notion of an Absolute into his philosophy. Aquinas starts his theology through a top-down instead of bottom-up approach; he first proves that there exists a God through five distinct arguments that also tell us the nature of this Absolute directly. The Absolute is the first-mover which causes all other motion to occur, the first-cause that causes all things, and so on. It is

from the Absolute that Aquinas uses Aristotelian metaphysics and logic to rigidly but firmly prove more details about the world, the details of increasingly lower beings, using biblical sources and the work of other theologians and philosophers to allow him to clarify that he is reaching the right conclusions. Instead of Hegel's speculative approach by discovering contradictions within concepts and resolving those contradictions to make higher concepts, until eventually there is a plane of complete consistency for the Absolute to inhabit, Aquinas's strict logic demands being rested on a plane of total consistency as God himself must be purely consistent with himself. Aquinas's theology is an expansive syllogism that goes forward, like a ray, whilst Hegel's philosophy is a self-looping dialectic, like an infinitely compact circle. Yet the geometry of the time that Aquinas's God and Hegel's God are the flipside to the geometry of their logic, for Aquinas's time exists in a circular, eternal form, in Aquinas's world, it is absolutely territorialized, absolutely fixed with zero speeds and never changes. In Hegel's time, it is a line that goes from the lowest state to the highest state, and once the Absolute is reached, the end of history is achieved.

Aquinas's eternity expresses that his God exists in an absolutely constrained form with no movements which exist for him, for in God, he is eternal, and self-same across all time, for he has already achieved perfection or Hegel's end-of-history state. The work to grasp eternity and hold it in our hands is a matter of differentiating between all the states pre-contained within God due to the nature of God's own existence. Aquinas's work uses an Absolute being which, instead of Hegel's being, does not have a complete indeterminateness but exists with an absolute, comprehensive determinateness. Simply, Aquinas's God is infinitely determinate in contrast to Hegel's infinitely indeterminate being. As such, his God, it is not infinitely discursive but infinitely territorialized, all beings which exist in Aquinas's God are entirely embedded in God. To change God into a new state is to entirely erase the existence of all beings that rely on God's existence. Since Aquinas's system cannot change, things remain infinitely territorialized within God. Yet there is an implicit contrast to Aquinas's reality that exists, since Aquinas's God implies a world that exists in a single, particular state always, there is a state of absolute deterritorialization right outside God's door. Just outside God's reality there are infinitely many possibilities, infinitely deterritorialized and entirely independent of God's grasp, all being an alternative to God's great plan and are all contrary to it. It would take only one true change to happen to entirely disrupt the entire world of God, the totalizing deterritorialization so devastating it enforces an infinite space of new possible realities, the profound weakness hidden in perfection. Behind God, a Cosmosis.

We may focus our understanding of being in terms of a Cosmosis instead. It is a belief that I have often held for a long time, that all of being is indeed a Cosmosis. That is, all possibilities do in fact exist in some way, in some reality out there. Being in other words, is the manifestation of all possibilities of being. It is a position highly similar to Lewis's possible worlds except that I take a more extreme position to Lewis where I do not constrain possible worlds to requiring them to be casually and spatiotemporally disconnected from each other. Rather when it comes to reality for me, anything goes! Thus I believed the opposite to Aquinas's Absolute God, with the total territorialization that comes along with it, I believed in a Cosmosis with the total deterritorialization that comes along with it. Such deterritorialization, "all being is manifested in all possibilities" reterritorialization itself such that we have an infinitely many possible realities. The existence of these endless realities is infinitely independent from any changes in ontologies that may occur, that is, the state of being a Cosmosis is not

embedded in any territory whatsoever. The Cosmosis therefore cannot be expanded upon by itself except by a discussion of how realities might cause changes in other realities, since everything is possible, there are infinitely possible directions we may go on. Since there aren't enough constraints on our discussion about the Cosmosis, it makes any discussion of the nature of the Cosmosis impossible because no discussion would be meaningful.

In the next section, we will dive even deeper into the four absolute states of being that each philosopher, including myself, have brought to the table. We will denote Hegel's being as the Being, Russell's being as the Atom, Aquinas's being as the God, and my being as the Cosmosis.

φ11: Four Absolute States Of Being and Their Relations To Each Other

The Cosmosis says everything but always in a different place, saying X at X and saying Y at Y. However, the Cosmosis, due to exhibiting all possibilities, also exhibits all incompatibilities with any given possibility, and is thus infinitely inconsistent with itself. Due to the Cosmosis saying everything at once, in its complete, infinitely broad plane of possibilities, the Cosmosis is endlessly indeterminate, and due to its endless indeterminacy can be understood in a new light. This new light rewrites our understanding of the Cosmosis by rewriting the framework which the Cosmosis exists in. Instead of an emphasis on the idea of all possibilities, to say that all ontologies are, we instead use the notion of an ontology which may contain all possible states. The endless plurality of the Cosmosis when we shrink it into a singularity, such that it is not "of all states" but instead "of any state" we would get the Being. Being can exist in any state possible and is therefore infinitely discursive, any ontology is a type of Being, and therefore Being can say everything. However, Being, as we have already demonstrated earlier in this work, is both the same as and the polar opposite to nothing, which needs to exist to substantiate the notion of Being. In a sense, Being says absolutely nothing, because in its own purely indeterminate state, it does not define anything else but itself through how it contrasts with nothing, empty determinateness. Being and nothing may be resolved in their tension with each other by an understanding of becoming as ontologies coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and make dialectical progression from there until we approach the Absolute. The Absolute as we have shown, says both everything and nothing at once. The Absolute attempts to exist as the total constraint of all reality, it is the highest point of all reality and thus its outer-limits. Yet because reality in all its possibilities is an endlessly inconsistent Cosmosis, a true outer-limit to reality would itself become endlessly contradictory and inconsistent with itself underneath its surface of being endlessly self-consistent and well-defined. The Absolute does not say anything except about the reality of our consciousness as being a self-perpetuating, infinitely compact circle which cannot escape itself. Hegelian metaphysics is not useful insofar as it helps us understand reality but rather is best as a tool for deciphering the circularity of all forms consciousness may exist in. Such is in complete contrast to my philosophy of the Cosmosis, which is best to view reality in terms of all possible and endlessly expanding ways in which beings may exist. Hegel's view is from the inside-out whilst mine takes an outside-in view.

Hegel's Absolute is constructed from a bottom-up approach from his Being. Since the dialectical progression from his Being stems from his Being itself relating itself to itself through the contradictions contained within itself, univocality is written into the

progression itself as we go from the determinate, its negation, and its sublation. When we reach the Absolute, the Absolute is a complete univocality which speaks only about and for itself, it speaks for nothing else. It is entirely inside itself. However, if we change our emphasis on what the Absolute represents, rather then being the consciously constructed outer-limits demarcating all that reality is and all that it can be, we instead view the Absolute as being all of reality itself and all that reality is such that its being and essence are the same, we lead into Aquinas's God. Whilst Hegel's Absolute is meant to be infinitely discursive in a positive sense, rather than in the negative sense, it is by direct definition so, that Hegel's Being is, by implication. The change in our understanding of the Absolute from representing the logical structure of all reality and instead looking at it in terms of the essence of all reality, changes the infinite discursivity of the Absolute's all-encompassing logic into the infinite territorialized state of Aquinas's God. His God is, in contrast to Hegel's, understood in a negative sense, we approach our understanding of God by ruling out what he can't be rather than what he is, Hegel's Absolute is realized by discovering the layers of what the Absolute is by affirming what must be moments that make part of the Absolute. Hegel's Absolute makes all of being a comprehensible whole, Aquinas's God makes all of being on the other hand, mysterious and never fully knowable. His God is intent on saying one and only one thing, for all eternity, and never to say anything else beyond this one Word. Whilst Hegel is spread out over all time whilst erasing the landscape of reality into a single point, Aquinas's God spreads itself over all reality whilst erasing all notion of temporality. Hegel's Absolute is meant to be immanent to all of reality through describing its nature whilst Aquinas's God transcends all expressions of reality that we have a handle on in his divine simplicity. In contrast, Hegel's Absolute does not aim for divine simplicity, but aims at a kind of divine complexity. Hence God is outside himself, whilst the Absolute is within itself, and God is outside himself because he generates all of other existence which is a lower being to himself like Platonic shadows to the perfect Platonic form that is God.

The basic concept that drives Aquinas's theology, the pantheistic idea of a first principle behind all principles which is perfectly simple, self-complete, and so forth, works best when we are discussing reality as a complete essence, especially outside of what our consciousness could ever reach or comprehend. This discussion can enable us to view reality as a complete and consistent holistic entity that can be broken down to a grand first principle that we may one day uncover. It can tell us what is on a theoretical level but it is highly dysfunctional at describing what we ought to do, since its ethical dimension contains an imperialistic core of Hegel's philosophy. Whilst Hegel is an ontological imperialist, imposing what all of reality must be and what it absolutely is, from an Absolute which has been abstracted away from the concrete reality that it was meant to help us understand, Aquinas's theology is in danger of expressing an ethical imperialism. From the standpoint of his God, and the drive to attain his perfection, frameworking good and evil as simply becoming like God, it transforms God into a master ruling over his kingdom of slaves. The purpose of following God is not to "do good" because good is synonymous with "being God" but rather to completely assimilate oneself into the higher power. All ethical problems are answered in one swift stroke by our dictator, and we are to do precisely as he says or else damnation to us all! Ethics is forced to be an "objective" space of answers to "what we must do and become" whilst having no involvement whatsoever with the real individuals, desires, relationships, and situations involved which construct ethical fields that contain multiple ethical problems for us to reflect on. Self-reflection is other-reflection to Aquinas's

God, the purpose of reflection is to know him more to become him more. I am unsurprised that Lucifer chose revolt over assimilation!

Aquinas's God and his reality are revealed through the unfolding of God through the use of both faith, God revealing himself and relating oneself to God whilst trusting him, and reason, using the form of the syllogism and applying Aristotle's metaphysics as the framework to drive the syllogisms forward. As such, Aquinas's theology is procured by the construction of rigid logical atoms, we begin with a single logical atom, and use our logical axioms to construct sentences which advance a new theorem about God's world. Hence the entire theology is structured like a Russellian logical atom, with individuals, the qualities belonging to said individual, and relations the individual is in with other individuals. It is just that both the qualities and relations the individuals have use concepts from Aristotle's metaphysics to be filled in. We can restructure the holism of God's world into a logically atomic surface overlay where all atoms are sensibly connected to each other like a super long chain of atomic propositions. However, we can theoretically detach a given atomic proposition from the chain of propositions, allowing it to exist as its own independent thing. This surface overlay of atomic propositions which can be torn away from each other and made independent, so that we cut off links in the chains, would reconfigure parts of Aquinas's world (not all of it) into the fragmentary piece-meal world that Russell's being inhabits. If we take a different angle to the kingdom of God, we can view it in terms of its piece-meal parts rather than grasping it as the entire structure that it is in Aquinas's theology. Whilst the Cosmosis says everything, in infinitely many ways, the Absolute says everything once, Aquinas's God says just one thing once, whilst Atoms say something about everything in one way.

Thus Atoms are infinitely many, forming infinitely many atomic propositions which all ask, "is this the case or not the case?" They are infinitely non-discursive, they speak only about themselves and are meant to exhibit the way they manifest distinctly of other ontologies which may exist. These Atoms remain steady throughout all of time and thus are unaffected by temporality, they are just facts of existence, but are spread out over all of reality. This is unlike God who transcends temporality and spreads out over all reality in his omnipresence. The Absolute takes temporality to the extreme whilst being spread out over all existence. The Cosmosis is entirely unaffected by temporality or existence, temporality and existence are just partial ways the Cosmosis manifests itself. The infinitely fragmented nature of Atoms cause those Atoms to be similar to the Cosmosis. This is because the Cosmosis exists endlessly fragmented as well, all possible manifestations exist at once whilst its status of being in such a way is independent of how other manifestations may be. This makes the Cosmosis atomic, not because we are worried about what "is" and "is not" the case in one reality, but rather, where a given reality is, "in what reality is this so?" Since Atoms may either be or not be, it also means that all Atoms are also a possibility, they may be either so or not so, and the so or not so conditions for a given possibility, since it exists independently of the other Atoms, will change the reality we are worried about. If we change the way we view being so that it is not only "of one reality" we are concerned about with how possibility may manifest, but instead that possibilities manifest in "some reality" we flip from the Atom to the Cosmosis. Due to Atoms precise nature, they are an excellent tool when we want to try and make our meaning or description of something as exact and well-defined as possible, until we might be able to approach something akin to a mathematical structure for our concept, with its precision, rigor, and clarity it brings with it. However, Atoms are hopeless at dealing with anything that is necessarily laden

in subjective interpretation and ambiguity, in which the attempt to erase that ambiguity, erases the concepts themselves we were originally trying to get a better hold of.

We have looped back into the Cosmosis, by going from the Cosmosis to Being and the Absolute to God to Atoms back into the Cosmosis. As such we have gone from the infinitely deterritorialized to infinitely discursive, the infinitely discursive to infinitely territorialized, the infinitely territorialized to the infinitely non-discursive, and the infinitely non-discursive to infinitely deterritorialized. This also hints that we can go in the other direction, we can instead go from the Cosmosis to Atoms to God to Being and Absolute to Cosmosis. This is because we just reverse the direction we are going by describing the common relationships that lead from one type of being to another, in the other way, rather than in the first way we came through. When we are mapping these four types of being to Guattari's metaphysics, we must remember that we cannot simply map them in terms of showing how they are on four-corners of the cartograph. I will demonstrate why later on. Instead, they represent the four absolute lines that act as the edges to the cartograph.

φ12: The Extreme States Of Being As Reflected In Guattarian Metaphysics

The Cosmosis represents absolute deterritorialization itself, it has no consistency with itself and exists at infinite speeds, that is everything we take about of the Cosmosis vanishes immediately as it comes about, saying nothing about any of the Cosmosis except the part of the Cosmosis which is one-to-one with what we were saying about it. As such, the Cosmosis is highly similar to the concept of the Chaos in that the Chaos exists in infinite speeds and has the same problem of vanishing at the same immediate point of occurring. The difference is that whilst Chaos is simply deterritorialization taken to an unbound upper-limit, the Cosmosis takes deterritorialization to the extreme yet is defined by by constraints that represents a firmly bounded upper-limit for deterritorialization, it is not possible to deterritorialize further than the Cosmosis. This is similar to how another way Deleuze and Guattari conceive chaos, as involving an infinitely fast cycle of referencing and referenced, expresses an unbounded upper-limit to discursivity and non-discursivity, whilst Hegel's concepts of being and nothing are constrained just enough such that they take discursivity and non-discursivity both to absolute limits, yet but a bounded upper-limit to both discursivity and non-discursivity. You cannot have an ontology more discursive than Hegelian being or more non-discursive than Hegelian nothing. Aquinas's God represents absolute territorialization, the state of there being one sprawling territory of which everything is totally embedded in, and acts as the bounded upper-limit for territorialization, it is not possible for beings to be more territorialized then they are territorialized in God. Russell's Atomism, does not behave as a bounded upper-limit for non-discursivity, such bound was already marked by Hegel's nothing, but since Hegel's nothing is entirely non-discursive in such a way, we can't say anything about Hegel's nothing except in how it is needed to define in Hegelian being. The basic premise behind Atomism is instead an unbound upper-limit to non-discursivity, the mathematical structures we can write in that are meant to represent things in their logical form could be infinitely various as individuals could have infinitely various relations to other individuals. We cannot determine all possible mathematical structures we may write, so we cannot say what infinite non-discursivity which is unbounded contains, and so we can only say that Atoms are metaphysically entirely empty and function solely as a mathematical-logical structure. Hegel's Absolute dismantles itself which is why it isn't anywhere on the cartograph, since it attempts to

say everything, thus manifesting all that Being can be, only to end up saying nothing at once, its total affirmation and total negation enrolled concentrated at one simultaneous point.

Whether or not the Cosmosis is discursive or Atoms are territorialized depends on the perspectives that we participate in. Atoms may either be infinitely territorialized or infinitely deterritorialized depending on which ontology is being put relative to these Atoms. In an Atomic world, the state of any given ontology is entirely dependent on how it is coded into that world, if anything in the code changes the ontology becomes completely deterritorialized and no longer exists at all. Thus an ontology is absolutely territorialized and embedded within an Atom in the Atomic world. On the other hand, Atoms are also infinitely deterritorialized as infinite possibilities in the viewpoint of an the ontologies outside the Atoms rather than within the Atoms, since all possible ontologies can themselves be coded in some way by Atoms, meaning that Atoms can endlessly reterritorialize and embed themselves into infinitely many ontologies. This behavior is then, why any mathematical structure itself can be embedded into any ontology which exists, and as such, mathematics always emerges from any ontology that we have. No changes in ontologies outside these Atoms will ever change the basic structure of those Atoms, they are still possibly are or are not, no matter what state the ontologies themselves are in, in Atomic form. The territorialization of Atoms can be spectrumized across the whole vertical axis perfectly because we can take an ontology to be capable of being broken down into a surface overlay of these Atoms, to which there are infinitely many possible arrangements of Atoms we can create. This means that changes in the coding of that atomically complex ontology can induce any degree of territorialization or deterritorialization into that complex ontology as we like, as that ontology can be made any degree of independent or dependent on the Atoms that it subsists in.

The Cosmosis is infinitely discursive when we are dealing with the perspective of any possible ontology. Each possible ontology is actualized within the Cosmosis in some way because the Cosmosis contains all possible realities within it. On the other hand, if we are looking at the Cosmosis in terms of any particular ontology, then the Cosmosis because endlessly non-discursive, because it contains all possibilities, simultaneously, meaning that nothing is possible relative to that given real ontology. All possibilities from the Cosmosis are meaningful only to that real ontology since those infinite possibilities become filtered into a finite range of realizable possibilities as the real ontology by nature, introduces constraints and limits on what can and cannot be. This is why, us, as particular, real ontologies, as we are all experiencers, cannot do anything meaningful with the Cosmosis itself as the infinite possibilities and infinite speeds it exists in without constraints makes the system of the Cosmosis incapable of being manifested in anyway for us specifically. The Cosmosis therefore says nothing about any particular ontology because the ontology is already the speaking subject as being its piece of the Cosmosis, whilst it says everything in every way for all possible ontologies. The discursivity of the Cosmosis can be spectrumized perfectly. It is all in how much an ontology puts constraints and hence puts a limit to the range of possibilities contained in the Cosmosis to make its own universe of possibilities. Ontologies which do not constrain the number of possibilities at all manifest as Deleuzian Chaoses and make the Cosmosis endlessly discursive. Ontologies that increasingly limit the number of possibilities they can manifest as within the Cosmosis, make the Cosmosis increasingly

less discursive, until an ontology limits everything to a single possibility, making the Cosmosis infinitely non-discursive.

Hegel's Being can be infinitely deterritorialized in that because it manifests in all other ontologies, and is simply what all other ontologies are, then any change in other ontologies will not affect the nature of Being at all. On the other hand, Being is infinitely territorialized in a different ontology, it is infinitely embedded on whether or not we accept the territories of the dichotomy of "is" and "is not" for if we changed that territory to be something else other than "is" "is not" then Being no longer exists at all, it is entirely deterritorialized. The spectrumization of the degree to which Being is territorialized is down to how much an ontological assemblage reflects existing in a binary "is" or "isn't." Thus, the more an ontological assemblage relies on the "is" "is not" binary for its manifestation, the more deterritorialized Being is, changes in that assemblage are going to affect Being more. However, an ontological assemblage that relies less so on whether it "is" or "is not" for its manifestation can change however it likes and it will have a much lower effect on Being.

Aquinas's God is infinitely discursive in terms of what his God is meant to have an effect on. Since God is always in infinite action, it therefore is always infinitely affecting all ontologies at once, and hence determining what the nature of those ontologies must be. On the other hand, his God can also be viewed as endlessly non-discursive, this is because he exists and can be comprehended only in terms of what he is not, this negative theology means that he transcends all other things and therefore exists as a negation to those other things. Thus God cannot be spoken of in terms of any ontology we are capable of mentally grasping, but we can make closer and closer approximations to him. The range of discursivity God has can be spectrumized in terms of how we blend together how much he acts on an ontology whilst at the same time how much he does not himself manifest as the ontology he is acting upon. Thus, the closer his action on an ontology reflects how he manifests in that ontology, he is more discursive to that ontology, whilst the further away his action on an ontology reflects how he manifests in that ontology, he is less discursive to that ontology. This is because in God's divine simplicity, his infinite action is the same as his very existence and the same as his very nature.

φ13: The Extreme States Of Being Are The Outer-Bounds Of Reality

We can finally entirely invert and integrate altogether the four different extremes being may exist in, the Cosmosis, God, Atoms, and Being/Absolute. This will thus complete our intertextual deconstruction of me, Hegel, Aquinas, and Russell, taking the next step to completing our philosophical inversion of the split binaries we've seen in each philosophy. We begin with a comparison of Cosmosis and God, two polar opposites in the type of being they define. The Cosmosis is infinite deterritorialization, it reflects the idea of all possibilities and their manifestation, whilst God is of infinite territorialization, reflecting an entirely particular, singular, perfect real. The Cosmosis and God can be blended together to be taken as two sides of the same coin. We first have to stray away from Aquinas's God and interpret him afresh, for we have to de-Christianize God. This is because God under the Christian perspective too heavily relies on strict frameworks of Aristotelian metaphysics and logic, and biblical text, to reflect the state by which our omnipotent and all-engulfing God would exist as. God must be taken purely as that he is, we cannot moralize his nature, he is neither good or bad.

Rather, God's status as having his essence and existence the same, as well as being the first principle behind all things and exhibiting infinite action, reflects the source through which the Cosmosis would fully realize itself. The Cosmosis manifests all possibilities through the true infinite act of our God making our God the creator of all things, and since our God is also the Cosmosis itself in an abstract sense as his action is the same as his essence and existence, God is also "perfect" insofar as he lacks nothing. Thus everything is infinitely embedded in God because nothing can be without God, and God transcends all things because God cannot be anything. What we have to remember is that God cannot be viewed as a moral agent, he is not an intelligence, he is not "wise" or "know anything" rather, he is analogous as an abstract category or like an abstract, infinite computer than an individual experiencer in the classical sense. The Cosmosis is about "all possibilities" whilst God is about "all reals." However, how much both are discursive is relative to any given ontology that is in a relationship to these two absolute types of being. Furthermore, how much an ontology reflects being a possibility or being real within itself is entirely based on how the ontology manifests its internal subjectivity, this internal subjectivity either is or is not, but it can potentially be any other particular. Hence we can say that any particular thing has exactly an infinitesimal chance of ever occurring, because there are infinitely other possible particulars which may instead be the case.

We can also blend together Atomism and Being together into one state. This is because Being is at the same time a nothing and yet the opposite of nothing, a nothing which Atomism exemplifies as it is metaphysically empty. All of Being exists in a state of "is" or "is not" and, since mathematics must emerge from any given ontology we ever have, means that Being must exhibit being a symbol A, whilst nothing is a symbol B which is simply not A. Thus A=A whilst A does not equal B. With this basic set, we can write mathematics however we like, we can construct infinitely many mathematical structures as we want through any arrangements of possible Beings we want. All Beings have a mathematical and therefore Atomic expression. Therefore we can go from the infinitely discursive, Being, into the realm of the infinitely non-discursive, the Atom, as they exist in one and the same state. Both exist on a spectrum of territorialization, for Being, it is how much ontological assemblages rely on the split "is" "is not" to substantiate itself. For Atoms, it depends on how complex the mathematical structure which would help describe an ontological assemblage must be. Being is about taking "all things" holistically, Atoms are about taking "all things" in a fragmented, entirely broken down style, they are about "one thing at a time." As we can say that the Cosmosis's power source is God, who is an abstract, infinitely powerful computer, we can analogously describe Beings as being structured by Atoms.

If we are to blend Being into Cosmosis, we mark that when the Cosmosis is infinitely discursive, the Cosmosis is therefore about "all possibilities that can exist" and therefore reflects the Hegelian Absolute which is attempting to mark out "all possibilities which can ever be." Although the Absolute fails to describe reality in any meaningful way due to saying both everything and nothing at once, what the Absolute does succeed in is describing every possible state of conscious thought which we can obtain and thus the way we would perceive and filter infinite possibilities. When Being is blended into the Cosmosis, it creates the Absolute, in the form of an infinitely discursive and infinitely deterritorialized structure. Therefore we can say that the Cosmosis is captured by us as the Hegelian Absolute. If we instead blend Atomism into Cosmosis, what we get is the Deleuzian form of being. How so? We can take the Cosmosis "all possibilities" to be

atomized in its entirety in a recursive form, each recursion marks new differences within the Cosmosis which enables new repetitions at the same time, repetitions in Deleuzian metaphysics which express a profound difference-in-itself of a given ontology. The Cosmosis behaves as the forever decentralized center of Deleuze's metaphysics of difference by being the singular monism all ontologies are a part of, whilst at the same time being forever fragmentable into a constant plurality of more and more ontologies which become differentiated and individuated. These endless differences fragment the Cosmosis perpetually, manifesting more and more complex Atomic structures as a result, differentiation and increasing diversity all the way down for all ontologies. The Atom reflects the condition that the Cosmosis in all its diversity can manifest itself as endlessly many structures within endlessly many unique planes of immanence, of things uniquely connected together in a forever expansive Deleuzian surface overlay.

As such, the structures within the Cosmosis and all the ontological assemblages that are possible within it exist at all possible degrees of territorialization, which thus must include the absolute territorialization of God. This is because every ontological assemblage must exist with some degree, even if to no degree, of dependence on Being, must always manifest as being a given Atom, and reflects a degree of identity and difference, Hegelianism versus Deleuzianism. Every ontology as manifested through God reflects to some degree, even if to no degree, the nature of God himself in the specific action he performs for that ontology. Hence the Cosmosis and God become inverted as they already imply all the in-between points of the real and the possible. Similarly, Being and Atoms already imply all the in-between points, between the actual and virtual, within themselves, and in their more metaphysicalized rather than logical clothing, there is a spectrum of combinations of identity and difference rather then just raw identity or raw difference as in either Hegelianism or Deleuzianism.

What we have shown is that the Cosmosis, God, Atoms, and Being are all four ways of marking out the extreme outer-bounds by which all of Reality exists. I say Reality with a capital R since to have "realities" is a useful term when we are discussing philosophy that deals with many possible "realities" as well defined by us, even though there is only one given Reality. Being marks out the extreme outer-bound of Reality in terms of its outer-bound in reference to our internal subjectivities, our first-person experiences. Atomic structures are an extreme outer-bound of Reality which expresses that all ontologies are necessarily describable in mathematical terms, that is, all Atoms are always descriptively linked to all corresponding ontologies. God is an outer-bound as God reflects the outer limits of "straight line thinking" or attempting to dig down into absolute statements and first principles, to which what we get is an infinite actor which creates all possible things, with God as perfection and things just shy of perfection as a type of "heaven." The Cosmosis is an outer-bound of Reality in that it represents "all possible things manifested in all possible ways." Since all four outer bounds together implies all in-between points in-between them, what we find is that all forms of reality exist within those in-betweens, but also exist in a relation with these four extreme types of being. Also to note, since all these in-betweens embed the ontological relativism that each of the four extreme bounds of reality had, in that their manifestation as the type of multiplicity they were, was dependent on the given ontology which was being put in relation to those extreme bounds, it proves that all types of multiplicities are known only by how they manifest relative to any given other multiplicity. This complete ontological relativism means that for a given ontological assemblage, we can only meaningfully say that an ontology has this degree of discursivity and this degree of

territorialization, this degree of becoming, from a reference point for which these assignments would make sense. We only get any “objective” states of manifestation when we are dealing with the extremes reality can exist in. These “objective” states are only “objective” simply because they are dealing with perceiving all subjectivities and intersubjectivities at once rather than making a selection of subjectivities that we care about.

This also gives us a major insight into the nature of both objectivity and subjectivity. That which is purely objective would have to be an ontology which perceives all other ontologies from an outside manner in a meaningful way, which means that mathematics is the only purely objective thing which exists. At the other extreme, what is purely subjective would be an ontology perceiving other ontologies by being from an entirely insider perspective, a singular point. As such, everything would be filtered in that given particular down into how those other ontologies must uniquely manifest in that particular. An excellent example of a purely subjective state is thus, our first-person experiences. With all the other in-between states, it is thus how much we are either looking from the outside or looking from a state within that marks how objective or subjective we are being at any given moment. Science aims at high objectivity by trying to eliminate the subjective as much as it can, by generating useful descriptive models that help us understand what we experience around us and the universe that seems to be implied through those experiences. It does this by making those models as “outsider” as possible by reducing the degree to which our models are dependent on any specific subjective experience, those models being understandable in the same, precisely determinate way, across all possible readers which may encounter this descriptive and predictive analysis of something analyzed in the material world. This is why science tends towards using mathematical models whenever it can since mathematics itself, being purely objective, if combined with carefully structured observable states the mathematics represents. This allows us to then encode those observable states in a way that is more strongly resistant to subjective interpretation and thus failure to encode its description and predictions of a phenomena into all instances of the phenomena we wanted to analyze. The more unique the manifestations of other ontologies within a given ontology is, the less transferable those unique states are to describing the nature of those other ontologies, and hence the higher the subjectivity is. Now, this is important to remember, since science deals with phenomena rather than abstract numbers, it means that science is rooted in the translation of subjective phenomena into a basic model that represents the phenomena in a conceptualized way so that all possible expressions for that phenomena are translatable into the same model. Meaning that science will always have a degree of subjectivity baked into it that it cannot remove, as the final creator, utilizer, and knower of science is always the subjective individual, not the “objective universe” that we cannot touch.

Hence, due to the spectrum between total objectivity to total subjectivity, there can never be a “truth” per say except for what we can determine for sure is purely objective. Rather, “truth” expresses itself in unique ways depending on what we are attempting to discover about ontological assemblages we see around us. “Truth” in terms of the scientific understanding of it, where we are concerned with how, from our subjective views, we can get the closest approximation and best description with the highest predictability we can of a solely objective universe we imagine outside ourselves, does exist in terms of what simply is and is not the case. However, we shouldn’t let the fact that “truth” as “is and is not” in our view of the universe fool us into thinking that we

can meaningfully describe how we obtain “truth” just as “finding out what is and is not.” If we work with the purely subjective, we are simply dealing with our own first-person experiences, at which point any “truth” only means “what we are experiencing right now” and “what we aren’t experiencing right now.” The complexity of epistemology really comes in when we are dealing with intersubjectivities and ontological assemblages that exist in in-between states between pure objectivity and pure subjectivity, and it is at these points that “truth” can be extremely fuzzy, not straightforward at all, perhaps in some cases not even meaningful to speak of or use. In intersubjectivity, “truth” manifests as a multiplicity rather than being singularised into the point “it either is or is not” that we work with in purely objective or purely subjective conditions. There is thus never a universal theory of “truth” we can parse other than the theory which fits the ontological assemblages we are working with at any given moment, and the applications we have for how we understand “truth.” This is where mainstream traditional Western philosophy frequently falls flat on its face with its understanding of “truth” because it wants to decipher the nature of given aspects of Reality it questions about by discovering the absolute Truth of it, but absolute Truth can only functionally hold in extremely limited scenarios. It holds only in pure mathematics or first-person experience, the moment we are dealing with any amount of intersubjectivity, “absolute Truth” falls apart. It is one of the biggest downfalls of Platonism and it severely restricts the scope of applications it has and the ontological assemblages it can meaningfully describe.

For us to speak about something in a reality or ontological assemblage, rather then just discussing “the nature of reality as it is in itself” we must change from focusing on its extreme upper-bounds and the states of pure objectivity and pure subjectivity, and instead focus on intersubjectivity. To fully understand interacting intersubjectivities, we will want to express those intersubjectivities in terms of our cartographical spectrums of discursivity and territorialization, as well as remembering that each intersubjectivity we are working with is a multiplicity. Each intersubjectivity is undergoing a becoming at different speeds, either null speed all the way up to infinite speed, as a vector transformation with two-dimensions along this two-dimensional graph. Speaking about things in reality requires us to be able to think in terms of networks and spectrums, not just rigid interpretations and binaries. With every intersubjectivity, we must work with complex vector transformations and complex multiplicities, rather than with the extreme bounds of reality we have been dealing with, which reflect extreme vector transformations which we may deal with.

ψ5: The Four Extreme Corners

φ14: The Mathematical Universe

Each upper-bound of reality will have different speeds of determinability. These different speeds of determinability rather than speeds of reference and consistency is given to us in their infinite senses only when we focus our attention on the upper-bounds of reality at the four corners of the ontological cartograph. With the corner of absolutely virtual possibilities, we have a combination of complete non-discursivity and complete deterritorialization at once. Thus we would have the Cosmosis blended with Atoms, a combination of all possibilities manifesting in all possible ways, in terms of mathematical structures, and thus we would get the mathematical universe. This mathematical universe references all other ontologies because all other ontologies are

describable in terms of mathematics. The mathematical universe contains all possible mathematical structures, meaning that it at the same time contains all possible arrangements of mathematical relationships, and thus all possible mathematical logical chains at once. As such, the mathematical universe has an infinite speed of determinability in that it determines things with utter precision and rigor, whilst at the same time it has an infinite speed of indeterminability. This is because we do not know what specific mathematical structure we are choosing from the infinitely possible ones, for every singular structure that exists there exists infinitely many possible structures which exist contrary and incompatible with that given single structure. Furthermore, the structures themselves do not represent any specific ontology and therefore doesn't tell us about anything except the nature of those structures themselves and how ontologies would be structured if they matched the basic axioms the given structure we have chosen demonstrates.

The Formalists are right about mathematics being about syntax and grammatical rules that demarcate how that syntax can be validly arranged because mathematics by nature is an unbounded purely non-discursive universe which means that mathematics isn't "about anything" since it isn't about anything specifically. The Formalist position suffers from a heavy one-sidedness, this is because the pure non-discursivity of mathematics means that it is in reference to all things, which means at the same time, all things are referenced by mathematics. Instead of mathematics not being about anything as the Formalists would have it as mathematics is about nothing specific, mathematics is about all anything as it is about beings in general and the structures beings may exist in and what beings must be if they follow the axioms of a given structure. The opposite extreme to Formalism where we focus purely on abstract universes of virtual possibility, is to focus solely on actualized real things, the Constructivist approach. We reject the reality of mathematics altogether because mathematics has no concrete reality at all and is just purely virtual structures, mathematics itself is ontologically equivalent to a Hegelian nothing. Thus Constructivism seeks the construction of mathematical understanding not through arbitrary games of syntax and rule-following but to demand that specific, real-world examples of a mathematical object must be produced to finally demonstrate that the mathematical object does indeed exist. All of mathematics follows from what we can actually experience, what is actualized in reality, and what is made real through a sensible territory it is embedded in. For instance, sticking one apple and another apple together would be an example of "two" by there existing two apples, territorializing two into being embedded and dependent on its realized existence on the existence of the two apples side-by-side. The Constructivists are right about another side of mathematics that the Formalists miss in their one-sided view, that mathematics must be regarded as being about real things that are actualized within our experience and reality. However, the Constructivists are themselves one-sided because, by viewing mathematics as solely about and dependent on specific beings, have lost sight of the fact that mathematics must be about ways of generalizing from things, and thus abstracting away from those actualized territories they are trying to embed mathematical objects into. The need for greater generality means a need for the deterritorialization of mathematical objects such that they can become abstract representations of structures and rules, they must become a set of possibilities which tells us something about how real territories which embed objects must be structured. For instance, the set of possibilities of what a general rule in mathematics can tell us can be useful in computer science where we want general rules for how binary-code behaves and what specific

strings of binary-code will represent, such as collections of strings being associated one-to-one with corresponding collections of colors to be displayed on screen.

These sets of general rules that mathematics is reconceptualized as appears to cause the Constructivist view to flow back into the Formalist viewpoint, that mathematics is a set of abstract syntax and grammatical rules telling us how that syntax is arranged. However, by going through the Constructivist view, we've learnt that mathematics must be about actualized, real beings, and thus there are actualized, real beings that are correlated to a given mathematical structure with all the rules that follow from that structure existing, and hence we have a higher form of understanding of what it means for mathematics to be about generalized, abstract rules. Mathematics tells us something about what can be experienced and what is inhabited within reality. The mediated view that resolves the contradictions inherent in the one-sidedness of the views of the Formalist and Constructivist gives rise to its own contradiction it faces. In having rejected the existence of mathematics altogether, it is in contradiction with itself as it is also suggesting that mathematics concretely manifests within experienced things and states of reality, meaning that mathematics at the same time is concretely real because it does describe these states. Thus our higher view falls in its one-sidedness to its other extreme, the Platonic view of mathematics whereby the entire mathematical universe exists as a concrete reality of its own.

The Platonic view reveals its contradictoriness almost immediately. Since the mathematical universe is necessarily infinitely inconsistent with itself, since all possible mathematical structures exist, thus all possible structures exist which incompatibly exist with any given structure, it means that there is infinite contradiction within the mathematical universe. For anything that is true in it, it is at the same time, also false, and is so simply by a change of the axiomatic framework we are using to obtain what is true and what is false. Furthermore, due to Godel's incompleteness theorems, no axiomatic framework can ever prove its own self-consistency whilst at the same time being complex enough to generate arithmetic of natural numbers and manipulate the arithmetic of natural numbers, and being capable of proving various things about natural numbers through a computable procedure. This means that in infinitely many possible structures contained in the mathematical universe, these structures cannot demonstrate their own self-consistency and therefore cannot be potential choices for what is the Platonically correct mathematical universe, since we cannot have a universe that exists in contradiction if it is meant to exist as a concrete reality. Unless we have an extremely restricted set of axiomatic frameworks we select that we can only choose from, there is always a chance that we may end up with an inconsistent mathematical structure in our Platonic universe since we can't ever prove it isn't inconsistent. We can't severely restrict the axiomatic systems we can pick from as otherwise we would be unable to make general rules that say something about all things, as we need the arithmetic of natural numbers to do this since there are beings that are structured in the form of natural numbers, such as the number of apples there are in the world. Restriction negates the Platonic view, and incompleteness in turn negates that the Platonic view could be proven or disproven. The Platonic view slides right back into the view that all mathematics express no reality at all, but from a mediated standpoint, we can realize that mathematics both expresses a kind of reality and yet is not real at all, we recognize that mathematics has a form of reality. In that, the mathematical universe consists of a set of non-discursive, abstract possibilities which inhabits an abstract, self-contained reality of their own. Yet this abstract, self-contained reality must manifest in a concrete

form. At the same time, we understand that mathematics is about general rules which tells us something about objects we experience and objects that exist in reality. The only concrete form for mathematics to manifest in, in our point of view, is our own consciousness, and thus we see mathematics not as a structure of the abstract but as a structure of the concrete, the structure originated from the mind.

This mindset is the mindset of Intuitionism, positing that mathematics is not the discovery of how objective structures and rules behave, but is more a mental construct from the mind which realizes more sophisticated mental constructs through internally consistent methods. The Intuitionist recognizes mathematics as a mental activity that requires forms of consciousness and conscious processes in order to be developed, mathematics does not simply happen or is perceived in an abstract space removed from the mind. This enables the Intuitionist to focus his understanding of the nature of mathematics in terms of not the essence of mathematics, as mathematics having an essence has been entirely refuted by the Intuitionist, but instead be more concerned about how mathematics is produced. This more practical-oriented approach enables the Intuitionist to decode how we are to go about doing mathematics rather than getting caught up only on the metaphysical curiosities that mathematics brings with it, something the Platonist may potentially be in danger of becoming too indulged in. However, the Intuitionist contradicts himself in his own anti-realistic state of mathematics, since mathematics is never about a specific state of reality, but rather constructed through the mind, it means that mathematics becomes a set of mentally procured sets of syntax and grammatical rules determining how that syntax is arranged. This further means that mental experiences or thoughts can embed these general rules into themselves, and thus the objects in the mind become mathematical. Since mental objects are themselves ontologies and thus themselves must be describable in terms of mathematics, it means that the conscious perception of mathematics, being the way mathematics manifests through conscious forms, means that mathematics becomes a way of describing all mental objects in the form of general rules about those objects. As such, it means that the invention of new mathematical axiomatic systems and the decoding of the theorems and useful rules that are implied through it, at the same time makes discoveries about new ways we can describe mental realities. Since mental realities are the ways in which we consciously perceive reality outside our given consciousness, those mental realities, when taken as representations of an outer reality, means that mathematics also makes discoveries about structures within what outside reality. As such, mathematics must not only be an inventive, creative, and productive endeavor as the Intuitionist would view it, it is also an endeavor of discovery, analysis, and decoding. Although mathematics in general does not tell us anything about mental states or realities, specifically chosen mathematical structures do tell us something about mental states or realities, as there is a well-defined range of mental states and realities which correspond to these structures. In turn, these structures decode and discover new things about those mental objects and realities. We thus must resolve these contradictions which forces the Intuitionist position to sublate itself.

Thus we recognize that mathematics is a universe of possibilities which has no concrete reality that is discursive with any other ontology but rather a self-contained, abstract reality of its own which is entirely non-discursive towards other ontologies. Instead, mathematics makes endless reference to any ontology that exists. Mathematics is about syntax and chosen ways to validly re-arrange that syntax, as these represent general rules and structures. These general rules are endlessly referencing other ontologies, and

since other ontologies necessarily can be described in mathematical form, these general rules tell us something new about these ontologies, especially in specified, actualized ontologies, which hence includes both our experiences and different objects in Reality. Mathematics makes new discoveries about objects, both mental and non-mental, since those objects may be structurally corresponding to a structure in mathematics. We at the same time, when we produce mathematics, are engaged in an inventive, creative process, because we cannot simply view mathematics as "general rules" in an abstract sense since that will tell us nothing but must invent our own mathematical structures, rules, and theorems, by selecting a single possibility out of the infinitely sprawling constellation of virtual possibilities that the mathematical universe exists in. Hence mathematics is simultaneously an intuitive and rational process, intuitive because we initiate the production and development of mathematics through intuitive leaps that cannot be made through rigid logic but only by an imaginative disposition, as well as incorporating subjectivity into the mathematical structures we make. This subjectivity incorporates consciousness into the picture through incorporating the objects we see around us that may inspire new mathematical ideas, such as how our experience of space inspires geometry, or experience of an amount of things inspiring arithmetic. It incorporates both our sensory experiences and concepts in our minds, but may also incorporate other aspects of ourselves such as passion for the subject which acts as fuel to drive our generation of mathematics forward. Mathematics is rational because it is about being able to follow the algorithmic procedure we axiomatically define in, however, due to our creative minds, we can use intuition to guide our logical analysis, since we can think in terms of multiple possibilities, we are not restricted to a singularised real territory which must run through its programming. Though we can use computers to assist in our computation of mathematics, as computers treat mathematics as absolutely discursive reals which are solely embedded into its code and must be carried out to its logical end, our imagination guides us in what new possible structures may be useful to us and what possible arrangements for the structures we are acquainted with will carry us to our aims. This enables us to invent proofs to discover theorems, whilst computers, incapable of any invention as they run through the motions, are only capable of discovering the logical end of the algorithms they are fed, and thus the end "theorem" that resulted out of what we put into them.

Mathematics, since it incorporates our subjectivity in its production, must also incorporate our subjectivity in its application, how we use mathematics to represent our mental states and objects in reality. Since ontologies manifest uniquely in each of our subjectivities, and can be interpreted in different ways, it means that there is a multiplicity of ways to represent ontological assemblages in mathematically viable ways. Hence there are multiple mathematical structures we may choose from to represent ontological assemblages we encounter. Although the mathematical universe, not being about any specific thing, and being a self-contained abstract state of reality existing outside all subjectivity and thus being a state of purely objective Reality, mathematics in its application can express conscious dimensions as it is applied to things interpreted through the consciousness into mathematical form. It is therefore a grave mistake to depoliticize mathematics just because the concepts themselves aren't political. Rather, the way in which mathematics is applied can reflect personal biases, political, ethical, and aesthetic viewpoints, it may even indicate exact purposes in mind and precisely the objects it is being used upon. Thus for any mathematics which is being used to represent something corresponding to states which are directly conscious

experiences or were inferred from those experiences, such applications enter into the realms of intersubjectivity.

φ15: The Phylum Of Actual Possibilities

The phylum of actual possibilities in its absolutely deterritorialized, absolutely discursive state reflects the beingness of each particular ontology in the Cosmosis. That is, for any particular ontology, it is actualized by being part of all possible ontological assemblages that such particular ontology may enter into. The phylum of actual possibilities is a combination of Hegel's purely indeterminate Being with the all possible determinatenesses the Cosmosis contains. Since this phylum is discursive, we therefore understand the phylum of actual possibilities in terms of having some determinate ontology we are perceiving this phylum through. As such, the touchstone for the phylum of actual possibilities when we consider how it expresses itself in the Hegelian sense would be determinate being, with being and nothing taking on new characteristics as expressing the qualities contained in a given determinate being. This is because the becoming of a being indicates that there are changes occurring in that being, thus a determinateness within that being must be changing to a unique determinateness. Becoming cannot exist without reference to a determinacy which is changing into a new determinacy. In reference to ourselves then, the phylum of actual possibilities becomes the space of all possible manifestations of a given ontology we are presented with, that is, all possible ways a select ontology we chose may be assembled with other ontologies. This makes the phylum of actual possibilities sound closely related to the mathematical universes but it has one major difference, since the phylum deals with actualized ontologies, it therefore deals with subjectivities and intersubjectivities, instead of objective, abstract objects. Rather, it is dealing with the range of possible concrete.

This phylum of actual possibilities is the realm of the sciences, engineering, and technology. It is the realm of science since science is about making descriptive and predictive models about all possible instances of a phenomena we experience that can exist within the reality we inhabit. The closer our phenomena gets to correlating to a virtual, mathematical form, such as speeds and vectors, the broader the instances of the same phenomena and thus the broader the range of applications our scientific theory has that allow us to understand that phenomena on a theoretical level. Technology is about the application of science, taking our theoretical understanding of all possible instances of a phenomena we have determined through the particular instances of the phenomena we've experienced, and then manipulating ontological assemblages in different ways. The purpose of this manipulation of ontological assemblages is to construct an ontological assemblage which will follow predictable patterns of behavior and is capable of changing other assemblages in a directed way such that those assemblages must transform into something specific. Thus technology is best seen as the specialization of assemblages such that they have the capacity to perform tasks desired to be performed for a purpose in mind. Engineering is about the making and refinement of technologies. Science and engineering have an objective dimension insofar as they both attempt to get as objective a picture as possible about a phenomena by making our model of the phenomena the least dependent on a single subjectivity as possible through the collection of swaths of related empirical data. However, science and engineering invariably have a subjective dimension to them because they are grounded by and hence rooted in subjectivity, science and engineering cannot escape the subjective.

Furthermore, science and engineering would destroy themselves if they attempted to cut themselves off from the subjective entirely, since they are reliant on the empirical and the mind in their formulation and production. The greatest mistake one can make in science and engineering is not to fail to remove subjectivity but instead, it is to disregard possible subjective states a phenomena might manifest as, and therefore to have an incomplete dataset for which we could then more successfully extract common intersubjective patterns of the phenomena. It's that successful extraction which is the key to obtaining an accurate reflection of the Reality the science and engineering is studying. Whilst mathematics is the study of abstract structures, science, engineering, and technologies are the study of machines on an abstract level.

Guattari's metaphysics, since it is about ontological mapping and the form in which the ontology manifests, degrees of discursivity and territorialization, as well as machinic behaviors ontology has, it means that his metaphysics functions very powerfully as a meta-model for the phylum of actual possibilities. This is because, since we can understand abstract machines only from an inside-outside point of view, rather then the outside-inside view mathematics takes with ontologies, it means that his metaphysics and perhaps by extension his schizoanalysis, is about how an ontology, such as us as conscious minds, would make a meta-model of all other possible ontologies we may perceive and we may be part of an assemblage of. This makes his model profoundly abstract, in a similar but different way to the profound abstraction found in mathematics. Whilst mathematics is profoundly abstract as it simply removes all subjectivity and assemblaging with other ontologies, except the ontologies in its own universe of metaphysically empty units, mathematical structures themselves contain not an atom of anything involving ontologies outside those used to define the abstract structure. Guattarian metaphysics is profoundly abstract because it removes all objectivity and deals with a totalized ontological relativism, the nature of any given ontology is determined not by itself but how it is relative to other ontological structures it is a part of. Guattarian metaphysics is a meta-model for intersubjectivity, analogous to how mathematics might be viewed as a meta-model for objectivity. However, since his metaphysics is about intersubjectivity itself, it does not contain an atom of any both realized and actualized subjectivity, meaning that his metaphysics on its own without reference to realized subjectivities is incapable of doing anything except act as a meta-model for the intersubjective. Guattari's theories are thus as much as a set tools and techniques as much as they are descriptive.

Guattari's metaphysics is all about how we map different ontologies from a frame of reference that existentializes the map, as well as understanding how the territories our map makes reference to works. This means that the frame of reference we use which existentializes our map is all important. The more contents our frame of reference contains, the more that can be expressed about those contents and mapped using Guattari's cartographical tools. That is, we must remember that no map exists without its territory! The more territory we have to map, the richer, more detailed, or more specialized our map is capable of becoming. These points reveal to us the extreme limitations that Guattari's metaphysical theory will perpetually run into on its own. The first extreme limitation is that without a rich frame of reference to make a map of ontologies we want to talk about, we are liable toward hyper-generalizing the territory or phenomena we are mapping. As a result, we express the nature of that territory or phenomena in terms which are extremely broad and abstract to the point that we fail to say much of anything at all about that territory or phenomena. There is too little to

existentialize, and so little is existentialized into a Guattarian map. The second flaw in Guattari's theories is that, by being focused too much on the scientific dimensions of ontological assemblages and intersubjectivity, overcoding the ethical and aesthetic dimensions through the inside-outside basis of his theory such that the ethical and aesthetic are meta-modeled primarily instead of being grounded on personalized and existentialized grounds. It therefore weakly connects to personal existential dimensions as it is talking only about existentiality rather than inhabiting these existentialities itself. Guattari's metaphysics is in need of new emphases on consciousness rather then the unconscious, the personally existential, unique, and untranslatable, the specific and situational, and an artistic theory describing how we can most effectively generate highly expressive and illuminating ontological maps. This artistic theory can be bolstered by taking inspiration through cartography, which is both the science and art of producing maps. Such a theory I would call schizo-art. The development of methods we can existentialize from our experiences more effectively when we make ontological maps, as well as how we can express those maps in a more beautiful and illuminating way, would require us to steer away from considering ontologies belonging to being actual phylums of possibility into realized actual ontologies.

The speeds of determinability of the actual phylum of possibilities in its absolute state, infinite discursivity and infinite deterritorialization, have been described in Schizoanalytic Cartographies as being infinitely fast but multiplied by infinite speeds of indeterminacy which have been integrated over. This way of describing the speeds of the phylum of possibilities can be enriched when we take a vectorized understanding of the multiplication of infinite speeds of determinacy by the integration over the infinite speeds of indeterminacy. The infinite speeds of determinability expresses one vector of the becoming the actual phylum of possibilities is engaged in, whilst the integration over infinite speeds of indeterminability expresses another vector of this becoming. We are integrating over the infinite speeds of indeterminability that the mathematical universe undergoes, in that we cannot specify any actual possibility in the same way we can't specify any virtual possibility. This is because in the Cosmosis, all possibilities happen at once, for any possibility we pick in it, there are all the possibilities which are incompatible with that given possibility. Thus everything in the mathematical universe, just like in the actual phylum of possibilities, suffers from infinitely fast speeds of emergence and vanishing. However, the actual phylum of possibilities integrates over the infinite speeds of emergence and vanishing, hence infinite speeds of indeterminability, because it is taking the actualization of all possible ways given ontologies can manifest. This integration tells us that we are evaluating over an area, this area being the plane of immanence that infinitely deterritorialized ontologies are structured in. This evaluation therefore takes the area of manifestation that the ontology has instead of viewing the manifestation of the ontology in terms of its hyper-specified and hyper-abstracted points on the plane that mathematics would grasp the ontology in terms of. The actual phylum of possibilities has infinite speeds of determinability because it determines the manner by which any ontology is assembled with other ontologies.

This tells us that, by breaking down our speeds of determinability into different vectors as part of the becoming of determinability that the universe of mathematics and phylum of actual possibilities are engaged in, the different speeds of determinability are really part of the same speed of becoming. We can therefore determine the exact speed of becoming for both the universe of mathematics and the phylum of actual possibilities by

taking the multiplicities of both indeterminability and determinability and describing where the two are moving in the cartograph. Thus Guattari's infinitely negative speeds is more of a pseudo-mathematical-expression as he is making a pseudo-model from his grasp of the universe of mathematics and phylum of actual possibilities, their nonsensicality being a reflection of Guattari's limited understanding of both extreme states here. What we really have here is determinability and indeterminability being accelerated to infinite speeds in different ways expressing different vector relationships. In the mathematical universe then, we've got infinite speeds of indeterminability in the sense of an infinitely fast emerging and vanishing, we've got an extreme state existing as part of Chaos within the cycle of the loop of Chaos. The mathematical universe is a hypercomplex of purely non-discursive states that are referenced infinitely in infinitely discursive, actualized, and specified states, making those states complex instead of hypercomplex. The infinite speeds of determinability spawn from how the mathematical universe determines anything with total precision, rigor, and clarity, that is, how the universe cycles into infinitely discursive, actualized, complex states that lead right back into the mathematical universe. The reason the mathematical universe's speeds aren't multiplied together is because they aren't occurring at the same position but rather are two different states the universe exists in simultaneously. The universe has bipolarized speeds, it is flipping from infinite speeds of indeterminability to infinite speeds of determinability back to those infinite speeds of indeterminability. In the phylum of actual possibilities on the other hand, we've got infinite speeds of determinability in which we find all possible territories for those ontologies to exist in. This is because we are integrating over all possible ways for which those ontologies can assemble with other ontologies, thus providing us with all possible ways those ontologies can embed themselves into other ontologies. We get infinite speeds of reterritorialization. At the same time, we are integrating over infinite speeds of indeterminability, or integrating over the whole area that the indeterminability of the constellation of virtual possibilities is engaged in. That is, the becoming of indeterminability for the ontologies in the phylum are an infinite virtualization, as the infinite discursivity of the phylum falls into hypercomplex, non-discursive states of infinite emerging and vanishing.

The mathematical universe does not have its becoming as a result of multiplied together speeds of determinability and indeterminability, because the mathematical universe is moving in two polar opposite speeds of becoming simultaneously. It is therefore flipping between infinite speeds of determinability and infinite speeds of indeterminability, actualization and virtualization. The phylum of actual possibilities has a becoming of the multiplicities it contains as can be found by the product of the infinite speeds of determinability which are directed towards an infinite speed of reterritorialization, and the integration over infinite speeds of indeterminability which the universe of virtual possibilities are engaged in, which therefore directs a virtualization of the ontologies in the phylum since those ontologies aren't being referenced by any specific ontology but is rather in a self-subsisting state. We can therefore gracefully lead from the phylum of actual possibilities into the most extreme state of territories of the virtual real.

φ15: Territories Of The Virtual Real

When we are dealing with ontologies being infinitely territorialized, we are dealing with ontologies being infinitely embedded into the infinitely vast territory that is God. Since God is the territory that embeds all possible ontologies and manifests all those

possibilities in terms of all possible ways by which those ontologies can be assembled to other ontologies, this makes God the creator of Reality in the sense that God is our infinitely powerful computer. This infinitely powerful computer computes all Atoms by which ontologies can be completely embedded within, and thus the mathematical structures that need to exist in order for ontological assemblages to exist in the state that they do. Now, mathematics has a reality only in an abstract sense but has no concrete reality, it doesn't exist in itself but only for other ontologies, each structure exists only because there exists other components of the structure defining the whole structure. Since God is computing every possible mathematical structure at once, it means that he "experiences" the entire mathematical universe due to being omniscient. At the same time however, God must actualize all ontologies which exist at every possible degree of actualization because those ontologies are being embedded in all possible territories which exist. Due to this actualization, God must not only be an infinitely powerful computer but is also a universal-observer who experiences all possible things. This makes God the same as the universal-observer that he discusses as in Ember Reed's In Service Of a Mute God, with the difference being he is used to describe all of Reality rather than to simply explain our own reality. God as simultaneously a universal-observer and a supercomputer has the elements of divine simplicity, perfection in that he lacks nothing, being eternally in infinite act, being eternal and unchanging, being immovable, and being the cause and mover of all things. The concern of Theology when studying the nature of God is to take God as his own subject and unfold the world that is indicated through him. Theology can therefore teach us more about God but cannot teach us about anything except God or anything outside of God, which makes Theology in its application viciously self-contained and self-absorbed. God, being an absolutely non-discursive virtual, is rationally and rigidly defined precisely as a kind of Hegelian Being or Hegelian Absolute, when we talk about God we talk about the nature of everything at once yet we don't say anything about any specific thing. Thus the Absolute, which gives us the way God would manifest in every conscious way to us, tells us about everything in general or the Absolute Idea we may construct, but it at the same time, tells us absolutely nothing about any specific idea. Leading back to what we remarked earlier, the Absolute manages to say everything and nothing at once.

Thus, God, taken as a subject himself rather than focusing on the ontologies contained in the world of God, takes God as an Atomic unit which exists "independently" from other ontologies, since God doesn't need to rely on any given ontology to exist himself. The infinite speeds of determinability which has been integrated in God's "becoming" is caused by the fact that God's "becoming" is the becoming of all other things, and thus he leaps from being a hypercomplex state of non-discursivity into states of the infinitely discursive and complex. These actualized ontologies have both had all their possible manifestations realized, and also all their possible forms of becoming and assemblaging, and thus discursivising. God is also infinitely indeterminable in that due to leaping right into infinitely discursive and complex states, we cannot select anything specific from these infinitely complex states, thus leading us right back into the non-discursivity of God. God also exists in a bipolar state the same as the universe of mathematics, as he is becoming in two opposite directions simultaneously. His infinite speeds of indeterminability occur for the same reason that the mathematical universe has infinite speeds of indeterminability. However, the speed of determinability he is engaged in, is integrated, since the entire area of determination along discursive lines has been comprehensively put together such that God manifests all possible degrees of discursivity. This is similar to how the phylum of actual possibilities manifest all

possible degrees of territorialization in their infinite speeds of reterritorialization that have been integrated over.

φ16: Flows Of The Actual Real

The flows of the actual real at the extreme, infinite discursivity with infinite territorialization, effectively represent an ontology that is manifested in all ways, embedded in all ways in other ontologies, and entirely dependent on the existence of the state of all other ontologies to realize its hyper-specific existentialized state. These hyper-existentialized states have infinite speeds of becoming in the classical Hegelian sense, in the sense of infinitely fast coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. This is because these flows have an infinite potential to become deterritorialized and therefore simply become so. The flows of the actual real have infinite speeds of determinability divided by infinite speeds of indeterminability. We may rewrite this to instead mean that the flows of the actual real have infinite speeds of determinability multiplied by infinitesimal speeds of indeterminability. They have infinitesimal speeds of indeterminability because they are hyper-specific and hyper-existentialized, there is no ounce of indetermination or ambiguity in such extreme flows, since all distinct ambiguities the ontologies of the flow may have has already been incorporated as realized states as part of the flow. They do however, have infinite speeds of determinability, this is because they are absolutely determined and absolutely determining, as such they are also undergoing a state of infinitely fast transformation. These endless speeds of transformation means that flows must become deterritorialized and less discursive at an infinite degree; once an absolute flow transforms in any way, the flow entirely ceases to exist. Thus the flow as a becoming leads right back into the mathematical universe. They leap right back into the mathematical universe which is infinitely deterritorialized and non-discursive.

φ17: Further Analysis Of Enunciative Recursions, The Four Causes

We have learned a great deal about the four extreme corners or most absolute states an ontology can exist in by untangling the confusion that Guattari introduced to his discussion and applying Hegelian dialectics to get a more clear and rigorous picture of the conscious forms involved in various concepts in these corners. We are therefore capable of adding further detail and expanding upon Guattari's understanding of the enunciative recursions of the four quadrant-states an ontology can exist in.

Beginning with Guattari's description of the four types of causes, we start with formal causes. In Schizoanalytic Cartographies he says, "formal causes correspond to the recession of diagrammatic irreversibilization resulting from the machinic Propositions Pm of the domain of the phylum of actual possibilities." What it means to be a machinic Proposition, Pm, is that there is a speed of becoming which is occurring where we are engaging in an integration over the area of infinite reterritorialization, whilst also going at a speed of infinite virtualization within the Cycle of Chaos. In that way, machinic propositions Pm express themselves as virtual Atoms which are each entirely distinct from each other, such that they don't need the existence of another proposition to determine its truth or falsehood except by necessary logical deduction. Machinic propositions exist in a split state of either expressing a state which simply is the case or is not the case, a given ontological assemblage either is or is not, a given ontology either is or is not. This is because machinic Propositions are related to Hegelian Being. The

difference is that machinic Propositions aren't dealing with just pure indeterminacy itself but rather with infinite possible determinacies. To say that we have a "diagrammatic irreversibilization" here is to express that we have this diagrammatic structure, or "surface overlay" or conscious representation of the phylum of possibilities in terms of irreversible states from the Atomic machinic Propositions which are generated through the becoming of the domain of the phylum of actual possibilities. As such, our formal causes are associated with objective temporality, and are described in terms of those Atomic machinic Propositions, that is to say that the study of the phylum of possibilities in its extreme state is thus the study of physics, since it is about making a predictive description of all possible manifestations of phenomena in general. Physics is therefore concerned with making a diagrammatic irreversibilization with a surface overlay of mathematical structures which are correlative and representative of Atomic machinic Propositions about the nature of the reality which we inhabit and, by extension, Reality. Physics therefore completely virtualizes all flows by making the description of these flows as independent from the subjective as they can possibly be, which means that physics must primarily use the language of mathematics in its descriptions and predictions. The formal cause is the mathematical description of the becoming of multiplicity, it exists in an objective time.

On final causes, Guattari writes, "final causes, or abstract puttings into refrain, correspond to the synaptic recession of singularization, resulting from the Constellations of Universes ∑U of the domain U." From the universe of virtual possibilities U, which can be understood if we consider the Constellations of Universes as being the conglomerate of many unaries, with the universe U being simply understood as a unary. This conglomeration of different structures marks different conclusions which must absolutely be approached and can never be otherwise the case if there is a set of ontologies which correlates to a given structure within the constellation. As such, the final cause is the types of causes that the field of mathematics studies. Mathematics tells us for instance, that there are infinitely many prime-numbers by deduction from axioms that sufficiently define the natural numbers, meaning that it is a final cause that prime-numbers are infinite in number in the system of natural numbers, you can't have it any other way! We hence get a singularized state whereby there is one absolute conclusion to be drawn from a set of structures and axiomatic systems that we pluck out from the Constellation of Universes contained within the general domain of virtual possibilities. Final causes exist as "fecund moments" (though they should be renamed synaptic moments) because they exist in an abstract temporality that does not have any concrete flows of time but rather exist in terms of instantaneous moments which emerge and vanish at once.

On efficient or energizing causes, "efficient, or energizing, causes correspond to the pathemic recursion of heterogenesis resulting from the existential Territories Te of the domain T." Existential Territories Te would be the actualized states from T through an existential dimension, that existential dimension being the actualization of territories in a subjective form. Existential Territories therefore follow from the discursivization from the virtual territory acting as both an abstract computer and abstract observer of states, at the extreme, being the perfect supercomputer and universal-observer that is God. There is a pathemic becoming occurring within the domain of virtual territories T because the actualization of ontologies of T are being designated through these existential Territories Te. Through this existentialization, we get an energizing/efficient cause because we are obtaining the conditions for ontologies to flow and undergo

changes. Thus these energizing/efficient causes are involved in heterogenesis or heterogeneous generation, there are diverse generations which are occurring from these energies which generate the states of becomings and flows for ontologies so that the potential of what those ontologies may transform or actualize into becomes realized through the energizing cause. The temporality for efficient/energizing causes is subjective temporalization because they are to do with the generation of becoming and actual reals or consciousnesses, and as such is about how subjective states with the energies that they have become new subjective states.

“Material, or concrete machinic, causes correspond to the existential recursion and necessitation resulting from the sign particles Sp.” This is to say that virtual sign particles crystallize together into material causes due to the necessitation brought about by those sign particles, in such a way that the flows and territories that describe the coding of our reality must be transformed in a specific, necessary way, due to the putting together of these virtual sign particles. This necessitation means that reality must transform in certain ways, not that reality is deterministic in the classical sense. This is properly speaking durations, and durations occur for any ontology engaged in the processing of signaletic particles. A computer processes signaletic particles which forms the territory for the computer to exist in, these signals being the binary-code of 1’s and 0’s which itself is embedded in the fine-tuned manipulation of electrical currents. This processing of sign particles is a processing of inputs into a machine, such that these inputs act as the material/concrete cause behind a new state that the machine emerges in after the processing, it is how the output occurred. Thus computer science could be said to be highly involved in concrete machinic causes resulting from sign particles, as computer science abstractly speaking, is about the actualizing outputs generated from a series of structured systems of virtual, non-discursive and non-enunciative signals. In terms of our consciousness, our minds would be machines territorialized within bodies of signaletic flows which are being processed that result in the emergence of our experience. It means we may identify the reality outside ourselves such as neurophysiological states as the material cause behind our experience, being the non-discursive, non-enunciative signals which become processed and transform into a mind. However, this identification can only happen in a solely correlative process that tries to approximate experiences to as close to a one-to-one basis to the corresponding neurophysiological state as possible. We cannot say that neurophysiological states entirely explain experiences since experiences as ontologies could potentially be re-assembled as part of new ontological assemblages or re-embedded in new structures of virtualized signaletic flows. The mind-body problem is an inherently unsolvable problem because experiences exist as their own distinct ontology from what derives our experiences, not only that but our experiences do not exist in the same state as the virtual, non-discursive signaletic flows which act as the territories for them. This is because our experiences, as actualized entities, are therefore involved in the perception of ontologies which are discursive and not non-discursive, experiences cannot otherwise be the case since one cannot perceive or comprehend ontologies as ontologies are in themselves. When we tackle the problem of consciousness, we are not engineering consciousness as how a non-discursive state became infinitely discursive is an infinitely unknowable leap, but rather we are reverse-engineering consciousness into the territories we can observe it being embedded in.

6: The Decoding Of Extreme Multiplicities

φ18: Philosophical Analytic Continuation Of Hegelian Dialectics

When working with pure Being or "the purely indeterminate" it will at infinite speed spontaneously pass over into nothing which then passes back into Being. The infinitely discursive cycles into the infinitely non-discursive in the bounded upper-limit of a Cycle of Chaos, such that the concept of pure Being and nothing are simply absolutely unconstrained states of Chaos. To obtain anything meaningful from Being taken as an "is" Being must be interpreted in a phenomenological light, Being must become conscious Being. It is only then that we can proceed to analyze Being or a given being within the consciousness in an enlightening manner. Hegelian dialectics takes what is a mental concept/object, a singular identity, and then determines the limitations and inherent contradictoriness that concept/object enters into because it is being interpreted in a one-sided way in the consciousness, all possible conscious manifestations of the concept/object have not yet been grasped. Due to this one-sidedness and contradictoriness, the concept/object paves the way to its own negation, but in the way by which the concept/object is negated, reveals a new side to the possible conscious manifestations for that concept/object, which reveals a higher resolution for that concept/object. Eventually, we obtain the highest state the concept/object can exist in within the consciousness, that is, we capture all possible conscious manifestations and what those manifestations show about the concept/object. In this way, Hegelian dialectics is the champion of an analysis of the logic and reality of the mind, especially as it synthesizes the phenomenology and logic of the mind into a whole. Hegelian dialectics is incapable of dealing with anything that is not a pure identity and not a mental construct, and so attempts to extend the range of usefulness of Hegelian dialectics becomes an ontological imperialism, it becomes the imposition of what everything must absolutely be rather than being a model for the forms of which something can express itself as.

To avoid this ontological imperialism when we try to extend Hegelian dialectics across fields of ontologies which are not consciousness, we need to take our tool of conceptual transversality to do the job well. Conceptual transversality takes two ontological universes communicating with each other, A and B, with unique perceptions of each other, A' and B', being assembled or united together in a new form C from a new theory C which is an ontological multiverse combining both A and B together in a bridged-gap but on their own terms as well. The conceptual transversality we want to perform with Hegelian dialectics is to expand the domain of applications for Hegelian dialectics beyond its ordinary domain of application. To do this, we need to consider how these dialectics and the new states they induce in with the conscious concept/object that it operates on is interpreted under a non-discursive, material body existing outside the consciousness which does not interact with the consciousness. Since these material bodies do not contain any atom of a consciousness which is required for us to apply Hegelian dialectics onto them, we have to extend the range for which a dialectical process can be defined so they say something meaningful about these material bodies. We therefore consider material bodies in terms of all the conscious forms they would manifest within our consciousness. What we then do is deterritorialize what our Hegelian dialectics unfolds about material bodies in steps with how deep into objectivity those bodies are in, so that a range of different interpretations we can make for these bodies are cracked open so that we are not restricted to enforcing a singularizing and prescriptive interpretation for what a material body must be.

Herein lies the value of the angle of critiquing Hegel's dialectical method whenever we say that it never allows material bodies to be the actual determining things, but rather we prescribe how they must determine themselves from the abstract model we make of those bodies. This is because we cannot do anything but make a model of material bodies that is abstract on at least some level, since we have to make a reference to those bodies, those bodies being non-discursive by nature, are not already referenced within our conscious minds. Hence we enable those bodies to be self-determining and hence do not impose what they must be using Hegelian dialectics or Hegelian logic. We are changing consciousness as both the territory and the map in one place which Hegelianism usually works with, and take forms of consciousness as the generators of the map that describes and makes predictions about the territory of material bodies. In other words, we go from the self-reflective process into a new brand of the scientific process. This scientific process is about applying our understanding of all conscious forms of how concepts/objects may manifest in our consciousness, and treat these as possible ways in which the material body we have may be conceived of or mapped. Thus we use the concepts and tools that are devolved from the Hegelian dialectics in a deterritorialized or flexible manner by which we determine which concepts we map material bodies as being in accordance with what those bodies appear to most closely express or resemble. This enables us to make new inferences or reasonings by abduction or induction using the toolkit of dialectic to describe how those bodies are likely to evolve over time over a singularizable temporal dimension, how they could evolve that is, in one specific way.

This expresses a new way we can perform conceptual transversality. Conceptual transversality in the context of being part of performing philosophical inversion is about reaching a higher theory which inverts a dichotomy by revealing how they become fully complete and fully realized only as parts of a spectrum. Here, our use of conceptual transversality is being directed towards what we can call philosophical analytic continuation, whereby we extend the domain of applications that a given concept is capable of being used in, beyond where that very concept is capable of existing in or manifesting as. This analytic continuation takes the concept as a tool being overcoded into other ontologies the concept cannot possibly manifest as or be referenced in, but in a controlled sense so that the overcoding produces highly to extremely approximate forms of expression for those other ontologies. Philosophical analytic continuation cannot provide us with a theory about concepts extended far beyond the domain to which they can have a realized existence that is about how the ontologies the concept is being applied to is the concept. This is because the concept exists only as a crude representation of the ontology, it is not meant to represent the ontology directly.

φ19:

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